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1. Introduction 
Macroeconomic  analysis  of  Latin America  has  long  been  primarily an 
exercise  in  monetary  analysis.  Fiscal policy  has  always  formed  part of 
this  study,  but  the  emphasis  has  typically  been  on  fiscal deficits  only, 
with  the  interest  primarily  centered  on  their  effect  on  monetary  out- 
comes  and  inflation.  This  emphasis  is  understandable,  in  light  of  the 
region's  history  of monetary  and financial instability, but the time may 
be ripe for a.  change.  While inflation has not vanished  from Latin Amer- 
ica, over the course of the past decade it has fallen nearly to single-digit 
levels.  There is good reason to hope that Latin America will no longer be 
a breeding ground for the extreme and exotic monetary experiments  that 
have in the past occupied  monetary economists  around the world.  If so, 
policymakers  in  the  region  will  have  scope  to  turn  their  attention  to 
other  policy  problems,  and  students  of  economic  policy  will  have  to 
search elsewhere  for lessons. 
We think  that fiscal policy  is one  area that ought  to be  high  on  the 
agenda for both policymakers  and researchers. In our view, Latin Ameri- 
can fiscal policy has been  under-studied,  perhaps with adverse implica- 
tions for policy, and certainly with lost opportunities  to confront theories, 
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such as the idea that the tax-smoothing  model is a useful positive  as well 
as normative model of fiscal policy, against an illuminating body of histori- 
cal experience. 
One  reason  for  this  lack of  attention  to  many  dimensions  of  fiscal 
policy in the region  is the difficulties  that confront researchers attempt- 
ing  to obtain  data on  fiscal outcomes.  The standard  data source  is the 
International  Monetary  Fund's  Government  Finance  Statistics,  whose 
coverage of Latin America is, however,  largely limited to central govern- 
ments,  and even  there has important gaps. The coverage of local govern- 
ments  is  spotty,  and  provides  only  a limited  breakdown  of  different 
budgetary  aggregates.  This poses  a serious  limitation  for cross-country 
comparative  work,  particularly work involving  important federal coun- 
tries such  as Argentina  and Brazil. The publication was  never intended 
to cover public-enterprise  finance,  which  is,  again, an important limita- 
tion  in a region  where  public  enterprises  have  long  been  a central ele- 
ment  of  the  fiscal  picture.  Thus,  one  contribution  of  this  paper  is  the 
creation  of  a comprehensive  database  on  fiscal outcomes  in  13 major 
Latin American economies,  which covers central government,  local gov- 
ernments,  and  nonfinancial  public enterprises  at a reasonably  detailed 
level of aggregation. 
Armed with this database, our purpose  in this paper is to lay out some 
basic facts about fiscal outcomes  in Latin America. We think that the basic 
characteristics of fiscal policymaking  in the region are sufficiently  unfa- 
miliar that a straightforward  and  transparent  examination  of the  data, 
not  excessively  colored  by a particular model  structure,  is called  for at 
this  point.  Of  course,  the  predictions  of  the  large body  of  theoretical 
literature on  fiscal policy-although  mainly  developed  with  industrial- 
country experience  in mind-have  determined  the questions  that we ask 
of the data. And  some  form of benchmark is required to make meaning- 
ful statements  about the data. But rather than confront the data with the 
orthogonality  conditions  implied by a specific theoretical model,  we have 
used  the  industrial-country  experience  as our standard of comparison. 
Nobody  would  argue that fiscal policy is determined  optimally in the in- 
dustrial countries,  but their experience has the advantage of having been 
intensively  studied  and  in many  cases  rationalized  theoretically. When 
we  identify  sharp  differences  between  Latin American  and  industrial- 
country  patterns,  we  hope  to learn not only  about Latin America,  but 
also  about  the  generality  of  theories  that  seek  to  explain  industrial- 
country experience. 
We do in fact find stark, qualitative differences between  Latin Ameri- 
can and  industrial-country  fiscal outcomes.  Fiscal outcomes  have  been 
far more volatile in Latin America than in the industrial economies.  And, Fiscal Policy in Latin  America  * 13 
in  sharp  contrast  to  the  industrial  economies,  fiscal  policy  has  been 
procyclical, and particularly so in recessions,  casting doubt on the appli- 
cability of the Barro (1979) tax-smoothing  hypothesis  for Latin America. 
We then turn to an analysis  of the relationship between  fiscal policy and 
the  exchange-rate  regime.  Countrary  to  much-though  by  no  means 
all-conventional  wisdom,  we  find  no  evidence  that  fixed-exchange- 
rate regimes impose  greater fiscal discipline,  and some evidence  that the 
reverse  may  be  true.  We also  find  that  fiscal  shocks  have  been  more 
disruptive  than is typically observed  in the industrial economies,  uncov- 
ering  evidence  that  in  Latin America  expansionary  fiscal  expansions 
have been  significantly  associated  with exchange-rate collapses. 
Some of these  differences  seem to us difficult to rationalize with exist- 
ing  theoretical  frameworks  for optimal  fiscal policy. We think that this 
should  concern policymakers  in the region, and motivate them to under- 
stand  better  why  fiscal policymaking  seems  to have  fallen  short of its 
potential.  And we think that the Latin American experience should inter- 
est students  of fiscal policy  in the industrial economies,  providing  as it 
does  a range of experience  against which  to evaluate existing theoretical 
frameworks. 
The paper is organized  as follows.  In the following  section we describe 
the  database  of  fiscal  outcomes  that  we  use  in  this  study,  including 
certain methodological  issues  associated  with  its development.  In Sec- 
tion  3 we  give  a brief  overview  of  fiscal  structures  in  Latin America, 
covering  the size and composition  of the typical Latin American budget, 
and the role of local government  and nonfinancial public enterprises.  In 
Section  4  we  analyze  the  cyclical  properties  of  Latin American  fiscal 
outcomes.  Section  5  studies  linkages  between  exchange-rate  regimes, 
fiscal outcomes,  and macroeconomic  stability, and Section 6 concludes. 
2.  The  Database  and  Methodological  Issues 
Our database on public finance in Latin America includes  13 countries,1 
covering  a maximum  period  spanning  1968 to 1995. In this section,  we 
offer a brief description  of the main features of this dataset and of some 
methodological  issues  involved  in its construction.2 In so doing,  we also 
briefly touch on some important institutional characteristics of fiscal pol- 
icy  in  Latin America,  which  are essential  for an  understanding  of  its 
behavior in the past 25 years. 
1. The countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Panama,  Paraguay,  Peru, Uruguay,  and Venezuela. 
2. A more complete description of the database, its sources, and methodology can be 
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2.1 COVERAGE  OF SECTORS 
The database includes  not only the central government,  but also the sum 
of state,  provincial,  and municipal  governments  (henceforth,  local gov- 
ernments)  and the nonfinancial  public enterprises. 
In several countries,  local governments  have access to a large share of 
total taxes,  either  directly or through  revenue-sharing  agreements,  and 
perform important functions  on the expenditure  side (see Table 4, below, 
for information  on  the  size  and  composition  of expenditure  and  reve- 
nues  of  local  governments  in  both  Latin America  and  industrialized 
countries).  Obviously,  a cross-section  study  of fiscal policy could give  a 
misleading  picture  if it did  not  include  local governments  as well.  But 
there are important  reasons  why  local governments  are important even 
in  studying  the  time-series  aspects  of  fiscal  policy  in  Latin America. 
Revenue-sharing  agreements  and the formal allocation of revenues  and 
functions  to  different  levels  of  governments  have  shifted  over  time, 
distorting  the  meaning  of data at the central government  level.  For in- 
stance,  in 1985 the revenue-sharing  agreement between  the central gov- 
ernment  and  the  provinces  broke  down  in  Argentina,  causing  many 
taxes that were previously  classified as provincial taxes to be reclassified 
as central government  taxes.  As a consequence,  the recorded revenues 
of the central government  increased  suddenly  by about 3% of GDP; but 
this was  obviously  offset  by a similar increase in transfers to the prov- 
inces.  A study  that utilized  central-government  data alone  might  reach 
quite misleading  conclusions  about fiscal developments  in that year. 
One of our key findings  is that fiscal policy in Latin America has been 
procyclical, and therefore economically  destabilizing,  while the opposite 
holds  in  industrialized  economies.  Since  local  governments  typically 
have a much more limited ability to conduct  a countercyclical fiscal pol- 
icy, the size and behavior of local governments  in the two regions might 
be an important factor underlying  this result. With our database, we are 
able to assess-and  reject-this  explanation  for our findings. 
Finally, the claim is often heard that local governments  are among  the 
key  reasons  behind  many  episodes  of  runaway  fiscal  policy,  as  local 
governments  under  political pressure  initiate highly  expansionary  poli- 
cies  with  the  knowledge  that the  central government  will  foot  the bill 
later. The bailout process  might  take several forms,  such as an increase 
in the  share  of  provinces  in taxation in formal revenue-sharing  agree- 
ments,  or an increase in unconditional  grants, or the assumption  by the 
central government  of arrears incurred by local governments,  as in Bra- 
zil.  These  policy  issues  are becoming  increasingly  germane  as govern- 
ments in the region devolve  authority to local governments,  including in Fiscal  Policy  in Latin  America  *  15 
many cases the authority to borrow domestically  and internationally. To 
assess  the  relevance  of the  dangers  that might  be posed  by this devo- 
lution,  one clearly needs  data on the role of local governments. 
In virtually  all Latin American  countries,  there  is  also  an  extensive 
network  of  nonfinancial  public  enterprises  (henceforth,  NFPEs)  that 
have  often  been  key  players  in  the  region's  fiscal  drama.3 (Table 6, 
below,  presents  the  main  summary  statistics  on  NFPEs.)  NFPEs often 
are the  single  largest  source  of revenues  to the  government,  not  only 
tax revenues-in  which  case  they  would  not  be  different  from  other 
enterprises-but  also nontax revenues  through  profit transfers. On the 
other  hand,  money-losing  public  enterprises  are  often  recipients  of 
large  current or capital transfers from the  government.  Because  many 
public enterprises-and  in general the largest ones-operate  in the key 
export  sectors,  such  as oil in Mexico  and  Venezuela,  copper  in  Chile, 
and  coffee  in  Columbia,  fluctuations  in  export  prices  are  a  primary 
source  of  fluctuations  in  government  resources.  Finally, NFPEs  have 
often  played  a key  role in  the  employment  policy  of the  government. 
For all these reasons,  it is essential  to include information on both local 
governments  and NFPEs for all countries in the sample,  and our dataset 
does  so.  This allows  us  to construct  series for the general  government 
(the  consolidation  of  the  central  and  local  governments)  and  for  the 
nonfinancial  public sector (the consolidation  of the general government 
and the NFPEs). 
As argued  above,  flows  of resources  between  different levels  of gov- 
ernment  (including  NFPEs) pose  important analytical and policy issues, 
and a full understanding  of the behavior of fiscal policy in Latin America 
requires  an understanding  of these  flows.  Hence,  our dataset includes 
information  on the transfers between  different levels  of the nonfinancial 
public  sector.  In consolidating  the  different  levels  of  the  nonfinancial 
public sector, we  take into account these  intersectoral flows. 
An important  issue  of coverage  arises also within  the central govern- 
ment.  In most  Latin American  fiscal systems,  "decentralized  agencies" 
outside  the main budget  often receive large amounts  of earmarked reve- 
nues,  and  carry  out  important  expenditure  functions.  The  same,  of 
course,  holds  for social security systems,  which receive the bulk of social 
security  taxes,  and often  substantial  transfers from the central adminis- 
tration. Hence,  our definition  of central government  generally includes 
3. Gavin (1997) estimates that subsidies provided in the form of below-market  prices 
charged  by the public petroleum  company accounted  for nearly 3/4 of the oil windfall 
that accrued  to the Mexican  public sector  during 1978-1982,  amounting  to 4%  to 5%  of 
GDP in 1980-1982. More recently, similar price subsidies have had enormous fiscal 
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these  agencies,  in addition  to the central administration,  which  is typi- 
cally covered  by the national budget.4 
2.2 BREAKDOWN  OF THE  BUDGET 
While  several  existing  studies  of  fiscal  policy  in  Latin America  focus 
mainly on the deficit,  or at most total expenditure  and revenues,  we are 
interested  in  a more  refined  breakdown,  for two  main  reasons.  First, 
different budget  items  have  different macroeconomic  effects.  Second,  a 
decomposition  of the budget is crucial for an understanding  of the deter- 
minants  of fiscal outcomes.  For instance,  as we  show  later, many of our 
findings  on  the  cyclical sensitivity  of fiscal policy  in Latin America  are 
unlikely  to be interpretable as the result of the optimizing  behavior of a 
benevolent  dictator.  Hence,  we  need  more  realistic positive  models  of 
fiscal policy  in order to interpret these  results; in this case,  information 
on components  of revenues  and, in particular, expenditure  can be of key 
importance  in assessing  the empirical relevance  of the different positive 
models. 
It is equally important  specifically to include  gross operating expendi- 
tures and revenues  of nonfinancial  public enterprises,  rather than only 
the  net  operating  surplus,  because  of  the  frequent  use  of  NFPEs  for 
employment  purposes.  Furthermore, we  disaggregate  operating expen- 
ditures  into their wage  and nonwage  components,  and operating  reve- 
nues  into  sales  and  others.  Besides  operating  revenues  and  expendi- 
tures,  we  have  data  on  interest  payments,  transfers  to  and  from  the 
central government  including  taxes,  and capital expenditure.5  This dis- 
aggregation  is available for most years in every country. 
2.3 QUASIFISCAL  DEFICITS 
The basic idea  underlying  the  notion  of the quasifiscal  deficit is that it 
should  capture all those  transfers of resources  from the public sector to 
the  private  sector  that  occur  indirectly  through  the  operations  of  the 
financial public sector. Thus,  this notion  should  capture, among  others, 
the  transfers  implicit  in exchange-rate  guarantees  by the  central bank, 
multiple-exchange-rate  arrangements,  interest-rate controls, etc. Because 
4. Our primary  source  of information  for the  central government,  the  IMF Government 
Finance Statistics (which we use for 11 of the 13 countries),  sometimes  reports only data 
on  the  Central  Administration,  particularly in  the  1970s or in  the  1990s.  When  this 
happens,  we supplement  the Government  Finance Statistics with data on the decentral- 
ized  agencies  and the social security system,  whenever  available. So far, we  have been 
unable to incorporate decentralized  agencies  in Costa Rica prior to 1987. 
5. For many  country-years,  capital expenditure  can be further disaggregated  into capital 
formation,  lending  minus  repayment,  and  capital transfers.  Also,  for many  country- 
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of the extensive  use  of these  policies  in Latin America in the 1980s, the 
quasifiscal deficit can reach staggering proportions.  For instance,  accord- 
ing  to  Easterly,  Rodriguez,  and  Schmidt-Hebbel  (1994),  in  1982  the 
quasifiscal deficit in Argentina  was 25% of GDP. 
While we recognize  the importance of the quasifiscal deficit for certain 
purposes,  we  do not use it in our analysis,  for two main reasons.  First, 
and most importantly, in our view it mixes stocks and flows in a way that 
is  difficult  to rationalize.  For instance,  the  face value  of exchange-rate 
guarantees-a  stock  variable-often  appears  as  a  component  of  the 
quasifiscal  deficit,  even  though  the  central bank might  never  be called 
upon to make good these guarantees,  and therefore there might never be 
a cash flow  associated  with  them.6 Second,  measures  of the quasifiscal 
deficit inevitably require highly subjective judgements;  exactly because it 
is meant  to capture all implicit transfers, there is virtually no end to the 
items one might want to include in it. In fact, Mackenzie and Stella (1996) 
list a total of 11 candidate  components  of the quasifiscal deficit, among 
which  are "poorly  secured  and  subpar loans"  and  "preferential redis- 
counting  practices." The problems in quantifying these components,  and 
in ensuring  a minimum  of comparability across countries,  seem evident. 
2.4 INFLATION  AND DATA  QUALITY 
Government  accounts  are  among  the  many  victims  of  the  frequent 
bursts of inflation and hyperinflation  in Latin America. At high levels  of 
inflation,  the interpretation  of many budget  figures becomes  extremely 
difficult.  The  most  obvious  problem  is  with  the  treatment  of  interest 
payments,  which  can reach  staggering  proportions  during  hyperinfla- 
tions  (easily on the order of 20% of GDP). The preferred solution  to this 
problem  is to compute  the real component  of interest payments  on do- 
mestic  debt.  However,  data on the currency composition  of public debt 
are available only for a few countries,  mostly for the central government 
only, and rarely on a consistent  basis.  Our solution  to this problem is to 
make extensive  use of the primary surplus in our analysis,  and to ensure 
that the results that we report are not unduly  influenced  by these poten- 
tially  problematic  data  by  dropping  all country-years  with  very  high 
inflation.  The  results  that  we  report  are robust  to  these  checks.  But 
problems  of data quality  are not  confined  to interest  payments  and  to 
hyperinflations,  particularly once one moves  away from the central gov- 
ernment.  We  encountered  substantial  variation  across  countries  and 
over  time  in  the  quality  of  fiscal  accounts:  some  countries-such  as 
6. This also means  that the quasifiscal deficit is inconsistent  with the cash basis for record- 
ing transactions  that we adopt,  whenever  possible,  in our Latin American database. 18 *  GAVIN & PEROTTI 
Costa  Rica-seem  to  maintain  very  reliable  accounts  at all  levels  of  the 
public  sector,  while  in  other  countries,  the  quality  of  the  information 
deteriorates  sharply  in  some  periods,  such  as data  on  local  governments 
in  Venezuela  during  the  last  decade.  To test  the  robustness  of  our  re- 
sults,  we  have  constructed  a low-quality  sample,  based  on  our  subjective 
assessment  of the  quality  of the  data,  and  we  rountinely  exclude  the  low- 
quality  data  from  our estimates.  Here  also  we  find  that low-quality  obser- 
vations  are not  major  outliers  in our estimates.  Finally,  as a further  check 
of  robustness,  we  routinely  re-estimate  our  regressions,  dropping  one 
country  at a time. 
3. A Bird's-Eye  View  of  Fiscal  Policy  in Latin  America 
In this  section,  we  briefly  describe  the  main  stylized  facts  of various  fiscal 
aggregates  in  Latin  America  over  the  last  25  years.7  Throughout  this 
section,  our  comments  will  focus  on  two  main  dimensions:  a comparison 
of averages  over  the  whole  period  between  Latin  America  and  the  group 
of industrialized  countries,8  and  the  main  changes  over  time  within  each 
group.  We begin  with  the  general  government,  which  is the  natural  unit 
of comparison  between  the  two  groups  of countries. 
3.1  FIRST  MOMENTS 
Table  1  presents  simple  averages  of  the  main  fiscal  aggregates  of  the 
general  government  in  Latin  America  and  industrialized  countries,  over 
the  whole  1970-1995  period  and  over  each  decade  separately.9  This  table 
7. To  ensure consistency  between the aggregates  and their  components,  we only use those 
country-years that include all main components  of expenditures,  and for both the cen- 
tral  and local  governments.  This  ensures that  the deficits  of each subsector  are  consistent 
with aggregate expenditure and revenues, and that the general-government  budget 
items are equal to the sum of the same items of the central  and local  governments.  Thus, 
the total number  of observations  in these tables  can be less than the total number  in the 
regressions  of the next sections. Notice that total expenditure  and revenues can still be 
slightly different  from the sum of their  components  because  of several  adjustments  that 
are occasionally made to the total, such as cash adjustments  or adjustments  for tax 
credits  in some countries,  which cannot  be allocated  to any specific  component. 
8. Our sample of industrialized  countries consists of Australia,  Austria, Belgium, Den- 
mark, Finland, France, Germany,  Ireland, Italy,  Japan,  Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Our sources are the OECD  Na- 
tional  Income  Accounts  and EUROSTATs  National  Income  Accounts.  When  we compare 
central-government  taxes  across  the two regions,  for  consistency  we use the IMF  Govern- 
ment Finance  Statistics  also for the industrial  countries. 
9. In presenting these summary statistics, we face the choice between unweighted and 
weighted averages. Each has its advantages, but we opted for the former because 
Brazil  and Mexico together account for more than 60%  of the total population in our 
sample of Latin  American  countries,  giving their  experience  disproportionate  weight in 
a population-weighted  aggregate. Fiscal Policy in Latin  America  * 19 
Table 1  RELATIVE  SIZE OF GENERAL GOVERNMENT 
Value (%) 
Region  1970-95  1970-79  1980-89  1990-95 
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22.9  21.7 
44.6  39.5 
24.0  22.2 






20.2  20.4  20.6  19.1 
42.4  38.6  44.1  46.3 
Simple averages  of country  data. Number  of observations:  Latin  America,  276;  industrial  economies, 
413. 
provides  a  substantial  amount  of  information;  here  we  highlight  the 
main points. 
First, a comparison  of the size of deficits in Latin American and indus- 
trialized countries largely depends  on the metric one adopts.10 As shares 
of  GDP, the  average  deficit  over  the  whole  period  has  been  virtually 
10. In this section, deficits  in both groups  of countries  are  net of lending  minus repayment. 
This choice is dictated  by the fact  that the source  of information  for the group  of indus- 
trialized countries is the National Income Accounts by the OECD  and EUROSTAT, 
which record  lending minus repayment  below the line. Also, for  Latin  American  coun- 
tries we only have information  about gross interest payments of the general govern- 
ment;  therefore,  in Table  1 we define the primary  deficit  as the overall  deficit  net of net 
interest payments in industrialized  countries, and net of gross interest payments in 
Latin America. The difference  is unlikely to be large, since interest received by the 
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identical  in the  two  regions.  On  the  other hand,  the average  deficit in 
Latin America has been  substantially  larger than in industrialized  coun- 
tries if measured  as  a share  of  tax revenues,  which  might  be  a better 
indicator of the ability of a country to service its debt. 
These  averages  over  the whole  period  obscure important  differences 
over the two and a half decades  of the sample.  Latin America as a region 
displays  a remarkable fiscal consolidation  in the 1990s, with a fall in the 
average  deficit  relative  to the  1980s by about 3% of GDP, while  in the 
industralized  countries  the deficit rose steadily throughout  the period.  If 
one  looks  at the  primary deficit,  this  difference  is even  more  marked, 
with  steady  improvement  by a cumulated  3.7% of GDP. 
Second,  the average  size of the Latin American state, as measured  by 
total revenues,  is about half that (21.6% of GDP) of the industrial coun- 
tries  (42.1% of GDP).  It is important  to note  that the  capacity to raise 
revenues  of Latin American  countries  has  grown  only  minimally  over 
time (especially  considering  the low  initial level): by only about 2.5% of 
GDP over  the  whole  period,  against  an increase  by  7% of GDP in the 
industrialized  world. Third, the development  over time of expenditure in 
the two regions  shows  an even  more marked difference.  In Latin Amer- 
ica,  the  share of total expenditure  to GDP has been  remarkably stable, 
increasing in the 1980s by slightly more than 2% of GDP, but only because 
of the increase in interest payments.  In fact, the share of primary expendi- 
ture in GDP stayed  constant  at about 20.5% in the 1970s and 1980s, and 
declines  to 19.4% in the 1990s. Exactly the opposite  pattern occurs in the 
industralized  region,  where  both  total  and  primary  expenditure  in- 
creased  steadily, and substantially-9%  and 8% of GDP, respectively. 
Fourth,  the  composition  and  evolution  of revenues  and  expenditure 
(see Table 2) differs in the two regions.  On the revenue  side,  notice the 
much larger share of nontax revenues  in Latin America. This is a particu- 
larly volatile  source  of revenues,  because  it includes  transfers of profits 
from fiscal monopolies  and  state-owned  enterprises,  royalties  from oil 
extraction,  etc. A comparison  of the structure of tax revenue  is possible 
only  for the  central government,  because  the numbers  of observations 
on the individual  revenue  items of local governments  drop substantially 
in Latin America.  This table illustrates  some  familiar results,  and some 
less familiar ones. 
First, Latin American  countries  rely much more on indirect taxes (in- 
cluding  taxes on international trade) than do industrialized countries.  By 
the same token,  the share of direct taxes is much smaller in Latin Amer- 
ica.  Furthermore,  about  80% of income  taxes in Latin America  fall on 
corporations  (a particularly volatile tax revenue) and 20% on individuals. 
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Table 2  COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND REVENUES 
Value (%) 
Region  1970-95  1970-79  1980-89  1990-95 
Nontax  revenue/  Latin America  18.1 
total revenue  Industrial  8.4 
economies 
Direct tax/total tax  Latin America  27.3 
revenue  Industrial  39.8 
economies 
Indiv. income  tax/  Latin America  5.1 
total taxes  Industrial  28.9 
economies 
Indirect tax/total  Latin America  53.2 




18.5  19.0 
8.9  9.0 
29.6  26.5  25.5 







51.9  54.1  53.5 
32.5  30.6  30.3 
Intl. trade taxes/  Latin America  16.3 
total taxes  Industrial  1.9 
economies 
Govt. consumption/  Latin America  48.3 
total expend.  Industrial  41.5 
economies 
19.7  16.2  11.2 
2.8  1.4  0.9 
53.2  45.9  45.9 
43.8  40.7  38.8 
Transfers/total 
expenditure 
Latin America  24.2 
Industrial  42.1 
economies 
19.2  25.9  27.8 
40.7  42.4  44.2 
Capital expend./  Latin America  18.2 




16.2  16.8 
6.7  6.1 
Interest/total 
expenditure 
Latin America  10.5 
Industrial  8.9 
economies 
5.6  12.8  12.8 
6.1  10.8  11.7 
Simple averages  of country data. Direct taxes include  taxes on income and property but exclude contri- 
butions  to the social security system.  The sum of direct taxes and indirect taxes does not, therefore, add 
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Importantly, there is no indication that Latin American countries have 
gotten  better at collecting  income  taxes. In fact, both corporate and per- 
sonal  income  taxes have  fallen over time as shares of GDP and of total 
taxes; as a result,  the typical Latin American central government  in the 
1990s collects  only  2.5% of its total tax revenues  from personal  income 
taxes."  The  slack  has  been  largely  taken  up  by  indirect  taxes,  and  in 
particular by taxes on goods  and  services,  while  the role of trade taxes 
has declined  steadily. 
On the expenditure  side,  Latin American countries  spend  much  less 
on  transfers  and  subsidies-24%  of  total  expenditure  against  42% in 
industrialized  countries.  The  difference  is  partly made  up  by  a larger 
share of government  consumption;  perhaps more surprisingly, the share 
of capital expenditure  in total expenditure  is about twice as large in Latin 
America.12 Also  mildly  surprising  is the finding  that the share of gross 
interest  payments  in total expenditure  is not very  different  in the  two 
regions,  and also increased  roughly  by the same proportion  during the 
1980s  relative  to  the  1970s.  In both  regions,  this  increase  in  interest 
payments  occurred at the expense  of government  consumption  and capi- 
tal expenditure:  the share of transfers kept rising throughout  the sample. 
3.2 SECOND  MOMENTS 
In many respects,  the most striking difference between  fiscal aggregates 
in  Latin  America  and  in  industrialized  countries  is  not  in  their  first 
moments,  but  in their volatility. Table 3 displays  the  average  standard 
deviation  of the rate of growth  of each budget item, deflated by the GDP 
deflator  (for the  total and primary surplus,  the table displays  the  stan- 
dard  deviation  of  the  first differences  of  the  GDP  shares).  This  table 
highlights  two main points.  First, fiscal outcomes  have been much more 
volatile in Latin America than in the industrialized  world.  Both the total 
and the primary surplus have been twice as volatile,  while  growth  rates 
of (real) total revenues  and expenditure  have been three to four times as 
volatile.  Each component  of  expenditure  has  been  substantially  more 
volatile  in  Latin America,  with  the  biggest  difference  in  transfers  and 
government  consumption.  Thus,  the higher volatility of the major fiscal 
aggregates  in Latin America is not just the result of a composition  tilted 
11. Note, however, that we have only 26 observations  on personal income taxes in the 
1990s. 
12. We believe that one should take the last figure  with particular  caution,  for at least two 
reasons. First, this difference  may have more to do with budgeting and accounting 
standards  than with the true  economic  classification  of expenditure.  Second, it is likely 
that in Latin America some financial investment (sometimes also termed "lending 
minus repayment"  or, improperly,  "net lending")  might have slipped into the figures 
for capital  transfers,  which are part  of capital  expenditure. Fiscal  Policy  in Latin  America  ?  23 
Table  3  VOLATILITY  OF FISCAL  OUTCOMES 
Average  standard  deviation  (%) 
Region  1970-95  1970-79  1980-89  1990-95 
Total  surplus  Latin  America  3.3  2.0  3.8  2.4 
Industrial  economies  1.6  1.5  1.5  1.3 
Primary  surplus  Latin  America  3.3  2.0  3.7  2.9 
Industrial  economies  1.6  1.5  1.5  1.4 
Total  revenue  Latin  America  12.2  9.8  12.9  9.1 
Industrial  economies  3.6  3.4  2.8  3.5 
Total  Latin  America  12.8  9.0  14.9  9.0 
expenditure  Industrial  economies  3.1  3.0  2.3  2.5 
Govt.  Latin  America  12.5  8.9  14.5  9.3 
consumption  Industrial  economies  3.3  2.8  2.4  3.1 
Transfers  Latin  America  22.4  14.9  26.5  17.0 
Industrial  economies  4.4  4.8  2.8  3.1 
Interest  Latin  America  33.2  28.2  33.4  26.1 
payments  Industrial  economies  9.6  8.2  9.1  6.5 
Capital  Latin  America  27.4  23.9  28.0  23.9 
expenditure  Industrial  economies  9.4  8.4  8.9  9.9 
Averages  of country-specific  standard  deviations.  Total  surplus  and primary  surplus:  standard  devia- 
tion of first differences  of GDP shares. Other variables:  standard  deviation of log changes of real 
quantities,  deflated  with the GDP  deflator. 
towards  more  volatile  components:  as shown  in Table 2, industralized 
countries  spend  much  more on a highly  volatile  component,  transfers, 
than do Latin American countries. 
Second,  in the 1980s the volatility of fiscal outcomes  increased dramati- 
cally in Latin America.  This increase was  across the board, both on the 
revenue  and on the expenditure  side. By contrast, in the industrial coun- 
tries volatility has,  if anything,  fallen during the same period. 
It might  be  argued  that  both  the  higher  average  volatility  in  Latin 
America,  and its increase during the 1980s, should  come as no surprise: 
the underlying  macroeconomic  environment  in Latin America is two to 
three times as volatile as that of the industrial economies,  and that volatil- 
ity  increased  substantially  during  the  1980s.  The  question  thus  arises 
whether  the  volatility  shown  in  Table 3 is  merely  a reflection  of  the 
underlying  economic  environment,  to which  fiscal outcomes  passively 24 *  GAVIN  & PEROTTI 
responded,  or something  else.  Unfortunately, disentangling  the sources 
of variability of fiscal policy  is more difficult for Latin America than for 
the industrialized  countries.  Schematically, one can think of changes  in 
fiscal variables as the sum of two components:  the first reflects the auto- 
matic adjustment  of the fiscal variable to the underlying  economic  envi- 
ronment,  while  the  second  is the  "discretionary" change  implemented 
by the policymaker.  The cyclically adjusted  fiscal figures routinely  pro- 
duced by international organizations partial out the first effect by estimat- 
ing what  the fiscal variable would  be if the economic  environment  were 
fixed at some  benchmark  value.  To do this, one needs  two things: a mea- 
sure  of  the  benchmark  value  of  the  economic  environment,  and  the 
endogenous  or passive response  of  the  fiscal variable to  the  economic 
environment.  Both elements  are largely unavailable  for Latin America. 
The typical benchmark  value  of the economic  environment  is poten- 
tial, or trend GDP. However  controversial this concept and its measure- 
ment  are in industralized  countries,  it is safe to argue that all the prob- 
lems it raises will be severely  compounded  in Latin America. Even if one 
avoids  these  problems  by  adopting  Blanchard's  (1990) view-that  the 
best benchmark  is last year's output-a  virtually unsurmountable  prob- 
lem  still  exists:  in  Latin America  there  are no  systematic  estimates  of 
elasticities  of the  different  budget  items  to output  and unemployment. 
By contrast,  the  OECD routinely  computes  elasticities  of the  different 
taxes from statutory  tax rates at the different income  brackets and from 
the distribution  of earnings. 
Despite  these  difficulties,  some  indirect evidence  can be obtained  by 
regressing,  country by country, the log change  of each fiscal variable in 
real terms  on  a constant,  the rate of growth  of output,  and the rate of 
change  of  the  terms  of  trade.  The  average  standard  deviation  of  the 
residuals  of  these  regressions  (not  shown)  displays  virtually  identical 
patterns to those displayed  in Table 3. This suggests  that the fiscal volatil- 
ity that we  observe  in Table 3 is more than a passive  response  to macro- 
economic  fluctuations. 
3.3 THE  ROLE  OF LOCAL  GOVERNMENTS 
What has  been  the  role of central and  local governments  in the recent 
developments  of  the  Latin  American  public  finance  briefly  surveyed 
above? This question  is of interest  in itself, but also in connection  with 
the topic of the next section,  where we compare the cyclical properties of 
fiscal policy  in  Latin America  and  in industrialized  countries.  As  local 
governments  have a more restricted ability to conduct a stabilizing fiscal 
policy, it is important  to have an idea about the size and evolution  over 
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Here again there are many possible  dimensions  along which  the issue 
can be  analyzed.  The next  two  tables  try to condense  the  information 
that is most relevant to our analysis.  Table 4 presents  overall averages of 
the main aggregates.  Because the size and role of local governments  vary 
enormously  with  the  size  and  institutional  features  of  a country,  we 
present  averages  for Latin America and  the group  of industrial  econo- 
mies  in columns  1 and 2, and averages  for the four large federal coun- 
tries in each region in columns  3 and 4. To avoid cluttering the table, we 
do not present information on the time variation of these figures, but we 
discuss  it in the text when  relevant. 
Table 4  LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
Value (%) 
All countries  Federal  countries 
Latin  Industrial  Latin  Industrial 
Government America  economies  America  economies 














19.5  29.7 
3.7  15.6 
15.9  23.6 
8.1  16.1 
Local-govt.  expendi- 
ture/central-govt. 
own  expend. 
Local-govt.  own  reve- 
nue/local-govt. 
total revenue 
Govt. cons./total  own  Central 





Capital expend./total  Central 





24  63  58  81 
81  54  76  66 
44.8  29.8  31.1 
60.5  61.8  53.6 
26.6  53.3  34.4 





6.1  17.3 
18.1  26.1 
10.8  18.8 









Simple  averages  of  country  data.  Federal  countries  (Latin American):  Argentina,  Brazil, Colombia, 
Mexico. Industrial countries: Australia, Canada, Germany,  United States. "Own deficit" is net of trans- 
fers to local governments.  "Own expenditure"  excludes  net transfers to local governments. 26 *  GAVIN  & PEROTTI 
Table 4 conveys  a number of messages.  First, the average own budget 
surplus  (that is, excluding  net transfers from the central government)  of 
Latin American  local governments  has  been  much  smaller than  in the 
industralized  countries.  Because,  as we have seen,  the average deficit of 
the general government  has been similar in the two regions,  the average 
own  balances  of the central governments  have behaved  in radically dif- 
ferent  ways:  a  deficit  of  about  0.3% of  GDP in  Latin America,  and  a 
surplus of 4.6% of GDP in the industrialized  countries.  A similar pattern 
holds  when  only  the federal countries are compared. 
In both  regions  the  own  deficit of local governments  has been  fairly 
stable over  time,  increasing  only  slightly.  Hence,  all the movements  in 
the  balances  of  the  general  government  that we  have  documented  in 
Table 1 have been absorbed mainly by the central government,  implying 
a large improvement  in Latin America  and  a substantial  worsening  in 
the industrialized  countries. 
Second,  the average  size of the local governments  (measured  by their 
own expenditures)  is much lower in Latin America than in the industrial- 
ized countries: 3.7% against about 15.6% of GDP. As a consequence,  the 
ratio of the local-government  expenditure to central-government expendi- 
ture (excluding net transfers to the local governments)-a  rough indicator 
of the relative size of the two governments-is  much higher in the indus- 
trialized countries  than in Latin America-63%  against 24%. Of course, 
this difference  falls considerably, but does  not disappear, when  we con- 
sider federal countries.  This gap has fallen slightly  over time,  reflecting 
the  move  towards  decentralization  in  some  Latin American  countries. 
Third,  and  perhaps  most  surprisingly,  the  ratio of own  revenues  to 
total revenues  of the local government  is much higher in Latin American 
countries  than in industrialized  countries: 81% against about 54%, and 
stable  over  time.  Once  again  the  difference  is  smaller when  one  com- 
pares federal  countries,  where  it has  shrunk over time: as the scope  of 
local  governments  in  Latin  America  has  expanded,  they  have  relied 
increasingly  on transfers from the central government. 
Fourth,  the  composition  of  expenditure  of  local governments  is  re- 
markably similar in the two regions.  In both, local governments  spend  a 
much  lower  share on interest,  and a much  higher share on capital and 
government  consumption.  Thus,  all  the  differences  between  the  two 
regions  in the  composition  of the  general  government  expenditure  are 
reflected mainly in the central government  budget. 
To gather  further evidence  on the role of local governments  in Latin 
America, we have divided  all episodes  of increases in the primary deficit 
of the general government  into "large fiscal expansions" (i.e., increases in 
the deficit by at least 1.5% of GDP) and "small fiscal expansions"  (i.e.,  in- Fiscal  Policy  in Latin  America  ?  27 
Table  5  LOCAL  GOVERNMENTS  AND INCREASES  IN THE  DEFICIT 
Value  (%) 
Latin  America  Industrial  economies 
Large  Small  Large  Small 
Government  expansions  expansions  expansions  expansions 
Change, own  Central  -3.3  -0.2  -2.0  -0.4 
primary  Local  -0.2  -0.1  -0.7  -0.5 
surplus/GDP 
Change, own  Central  1.5  0.5  1.7  0.6 
expendi-  Local  0.2  0.1  0.6  0.3 
ture/GDP 
Change, net  0  0  0.4  0.2 
transfers  to 
local govern- 
ment/GDP 
Large  expansion:  increase  in the primary  deficit  of the general  government  by at least 1.5%  of GDP.  Small 
expansion:  increase  in the primary  deficit  between 0 and 1.5%  of GDP. 
creases in the deficit between  0 and 1.5% of GDP), and we have asked the 
question: do local governments  in Latin America disproportionately  con- 
tribute to episodes  of very expansionary  fiscal policy? The answer,  dis- 
played in Table 5, is that the opposite  seems  to be true: on average, local 
governments  in industrial economies  seem to be responsible for a sizable 
part of large expansions;  the contribution of Latin American local govern- 
ments  to episodes  of very expansionary  fiscal policy, by contrast, seems 
negligible.  This statement  also holds  whether  one considers  the deficit, 
total expenditure,  or net transfers between  the two levels of governments. 
The  main  conclusion  we  derive  from this  brief comparison  of  local 
governments  in Latin American  and  in industrialized  countries  is that 
differences  in the structure and role of local governments  are unlikely to 
explain the strikingly different macroeconomic  features of fiscal policy in 
the  two  regions,  which  we  document  in the next sections.  While there 
may  have  been  specific  incidents  in  which  local governments  created 
fiscal disruption,  there is little or no evidence  for the region as a whole 
that local governments  have been  a more important cause of deficits in 
Latin America than in the industralized  countries; if anything,  much of 
our evidence  points  in the opposite  direction.'3 
13. One caveat to this conclusion is worth mentioning.  In some cases local governments  have 
accumulated  large arrears that were then assumed  by the central government.  To the ex- 
tent that this transaction is recorded below the line, it might not be recorded in our data. 28 *  GAVIN  & PEROTTI 
3.4 THE  ROLE  OF NONFINANCIAL  PUBLIC  ENTERPRISES 
Table 6 displays  a few  summary  statistics  on NFPEs in Latin America. 
Before discussing  the main findings,  however,  it is necessary  to mention 
briefly two important caveats.  First, public-enterprise  data are of consid- 
erably  lower  quality  than  central-government  data,  and  possibly  than 
local government  data. Still, to the extent that the data show  clear trends 
over time,  it is not clear why  the noise in the data should be responsible 
for these  trends.  Second,  transfers between  the general government  and 
NFPEs  are  notoriously  difficult  to  measure.  We eliminate  part of  the 
noise  by  focusing  on  total transfers,  without  attempting  a breakdown 
into current and capital transfers, which  is largely subjective.  Still, offi- 
cial data are unlikely  to capture all transfers. In particular, our measure 
of transfers from NFPEs to the general government  mostly include direct 
taxes and transfers of profits; thus, in general they do not include produc- 
tion taxes,  which  might  be the most  significant  component  of the flow 
from NFPEs to the general government.  In addition,  social security taxes 
paid by NFPEs are generally included  in wage  payments. 
With  these  two  caveats  in mind,  the  first message  of Table 6 is  the 
remarkable turnaround in the balances of the NFPEs over time. The own 
(that is, excluding  net transfers from the general government)  surplus of 
the nonfinancial  public enterprises  has increased from -1.6%  of GDP in 
the 1970s to 2.5% of GDP in the 1990s. 
Second,  the  total own  expenditure  of nonfinancial  public enterprises 
increased  substantially-by  almost  3% of  GDP-over  the  1980s  and 
then  fell  by  an  even  more  substantial  5% of  GDP  during  the  1990s, 
obviously  reflecting  the  move  towards  privatization  in many  countries 
of the region. 
To show  the  role  of NFPEs,  Table 6 also  displays  their share  in  the 
wage  and capital expenditures  of the nonfinancial  public sector. As one 
Table  6  NONFINANCIAL  PUBLIC  ENTERPRISES  IN LATIN  AMERICA 
Value  (%) 
1970-95  1970-79  1980-89  1990-95 
NFPE  total own expenditure/GDP  13.3  12.6  15.3  10.4 
NFPE  total surplus/GDP  0.2  -1.6  0.3  2.5 
NFPE  net transfers  to gen. govt./GDP  1.5  0.4  1.8  2.7 
NFPE  wages/NFPS  wages  23.9  22.4  25.9  22 
NFPE  capital  expend./NFPS  capital  43.1  42.3  46.9  36.1 
expend. 
NFPE: nonfinancial  public enterprises.  NFPS: nonfinancial public sector. Number of observations  is 257 
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Table  7  VOLATILITY  OF NONFINANCIAL  PUBLIC  ENTERPRISES  IN 
LATIN  AMERICA 
Average  standard  deviation  (%) 
1970-95  1970-79  1980-89  1990-95 
Total  own surplus  1.9  2.1  1.9  1.3 
Total  own expenditure  17.1  18.1  12.9  12.6 
Wages  19.2  17.2  16.8  13.8 
Capital  expenditure  33.5  31.1  32.2  24 
Total  transfers  to general government  56.5  51.2  58.3  39.4 
Averages  of  country-specific  standard  deviations  of  growth  rates of real quantities.  For the  surplus, 
standard deviation  of first differences  of GDP shares. 
can see, NFPEs are responsible  for about 25% of the wages and a remark- 
able  43% of  the  capital  expenditure  of  the  nonfinancial  public  sector. 
Consistent  with  the fall in the importance  of NFPEs, these  shares have 
fallen considerably  in the 1990s. 
Finally, Table 7 also shows  that the volatility of the main aggregates  of 
nonfinancial  public enterprises  has been  comparable to that of the gen- 
eral government.  In particular, note the very large volatility of transfers 
from NFPEs to the general government,  and compare it with the volatil- 
ity of other budget  items of the general government  from Table 3. 
Notice,  however,  that compared  to the figures of Table 3 the volatility 
of the  budget  items  of NFPEs declined  in the  1980s or increased  very 
slightly,  rather than  increasing  drastically as in the  case of the general 
government. 
4.  The  Cyclical  Properties  of Fiscal  Policy  in Latin  America 
We have argued that the volatility of fiscal outcomes  in Latin America is 
striking. In this section  we  shall argue that the covariation of fiscal out- 
comes  with  macroeconomic  fluctuations  is even  more so.  What should 
we  expect to see? According  to the neoclassical  approach to optimal tax 
policy (Barro, 1979), favorable shocks to the tax base should be accompa- 
nied by increases  in the surplus (the optimal magnitude  of which would 
depend  primarily upon  the  persistence  of the  shock),  and  vice  versa. 
Keynesian  approaches  to  optimal  fiscal policy  reach a broadly  similar 
result by different  logic-according  to that view,  policy  should,  during 
macroeconomic  booms,  at least permit the appearance of surpluses  that 
emerge  from the automatic  stabilizers that are built into the fiscal struc- 
ture, and  should  perhaps  go further with  discretionary tax increases  or 
spending  cuts.  Either approach suggests  that surpluses  should  increase 30 *  GAVIN  & PEROTTI 
Table  8  CYCLICAL  PROPERTIES  OF THE  FISCAL  BALANCE 
OLS coefficients 
Good  and bad times 
Overall  distinguished 
Industrial  Latin  Industrial  Latin 
economies  America  economies  America 
Real  GDP growth  0.368  0.042  - 
(10.5)  (1.10) 
Real GDP growth: good  times (bo)  0.258  0.083 
(6.29)  (1.42) 
Real GDP growth: bad times (bl)  -  -0.944  -0.019 
(7.42)  (-0.25) 
Percent  change in terms of trade  0.034  0.015  0.027  0.015 
(1.92)  (1.20)  (1.93)  (1.23) 
Lagged  fiscal  balance  -0.174  -0.292  -0.173  -0.295 
(-5.64)  (-5.43)  (-5.80)  (-5.49) 
Degrees of freedom  314  257  313  256 
Adjusted R2  0.286  0.084  0.331  0.084 
Significance,  bo  = b,  0  0.35 
General  government.  Dependent  variable  is the change  in the overall  fiscal  surplus,  measured  as a share 
of GDP. 
t-statistics  are given in parentheses.  Country  dummy  variables  are included  in all regressions. 
in good  times and decline in bad. We begin in Section 4.1 with the facts, 
and turn to interpretations  in Section 4.2. 
4.1 SYLIZED  FACTS 
The first column  of Table 8 shows  that the  presumption  of procyclical 
surpluses  is borne out by the industrial-country  data. That table reports 
the results  of regressing  the change  in the fiscal surplus  of the general 
government  (measured  as a share of GDP) on the rate of growth  of real 
GDP, the percentage  change  in the terms of trade, and the lagged  fiscal 
surplus.14 We interpret  the  coefficient  on  output  growth  as the impact 
on  fiscal outcomes  of changes  in the real output  and income,  incorpo- 
rating both automatic stabilizers and any discretionary policy responses 
to output  shocks  that authorities  are typically  able to muster  during  a 
year. (We shall have more to say about this interpretation below.) 
The estimate,  summarized  in columns  1 and 2 of Table 8, suggests  that 
in the industrial economies  a one-percentage-point  increase in the rate of 
14. This  is  essentially  the  same  specification  as estimated  by Bayoumi  and  Eichengreen 
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output  growth  is  associated  with  an  increase  in  the  fiscal  surplus  of 
about  0.37  percentage  points  of  GDP. In Latin America,  on  the  other 
hand,  the fiscal response  is negligible; the point estimate is 0.042, and it 
is not  statistically  significantly  different  from zero.  This weak  relation- 
ship  between  the  economy  and  the  fiscal balance  suggests  procyclical 
discretionary  fiscal policy responses  to economic  fluctuations; for in the 
absence of such a response  the fiscal balance would  naturally improve in 
good  times and deteriorate in bad. 
In Latin America  we  also  see  a much  stronger relationship  between 
the fiscal surplus  and subsequent  changes  in the balance, implying  that 
fiscal imbalances  are less  persistent  there than in the industrial  econo- 
mies.  In the industrial economies  the half-life of an increase in the fiscal 
deficit is about 3.5 years; in Latin America, about 2 years. We will give an 
interpretation  of this finding below. 
4.1.1  Fiscal  Policy  Is  Particularly  Procyclical  in  Bad  Macroeconomic 
Times  The contrast between  Latin America and the industrial economies 
is  even  sharper if we  distinguish  between  good  macroeconomic  times 
and bad. Here we defined bad  times  as years during which a country's rate 
of output  growth  is less  than its average rate of growth minus one stan- 
dard deviation; all other times are good times. (Roughly similar results are 
obtained  when  bad  times  are  defined  as  periods  of  negative  output 
growth.)  In columns  3 and 4 of Table 8 we allow the sensitivity  of fiscal 
outcomes  to differ in good  and bad times. 
In the  industrial  economies  we  discover  a major asymmetry  in  the 
fiscal response  to output  shocks.  During good  times the budget  surplus 
increases  by about 0.25 percentage  points  for every percentage  point by 
which  GDP  growth  increases.  During  bad  times,  however,  the  fiscal 
response  to changes  in output  growth is much larger: a one-percentage- 
point  decline  in GDP growth  is associated  with  an increase in the fiscal 
deficit of nearly one percentage  point of GDP. This asymmetry is statisti- 
cally significant  at very high  confidence  levels.  It is consistent  with  the 
idea that recessions  are economically  and/or politically more costly than 
output booms,  and that the fiscal policy response  to them is accordingly 
stronger.  It is also  consistent  with  the  idea  that some  elements  of the 
fiscal structure,  such as unemployment  compensation,  are relatively in- 
sensitive  to  the  business  cycle  at high  levels  of economic  activity, but 
become  larger  in  deep  recessions.  The  asymmetry  could  also  be  ex- 
plained  by standard tax-smoothing  arguments  if it is assumed  that eco- 
nomic  fluctuations  associated  with  recessions  are expected  to be much 
less  persistent  than  those  of  normal  times,  although  this  neoclassical 
explanation  would  be  somewhat  difficult to square with  the evidence, 32 *  GAVIN  & PEROTTI 
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presented  below,  that the  asymmetry  arises  from the  spending  rather 
than from the tax side of industrial-country  budgets. 
Whatever  the  reason  for  the  asymmetry  observed  in  the  industrial 
economies,  it  apparently  does  not  apply  to  Latin America;  the  point 
estimates  in column 4 of Table 8 suggest  that any asymmetry in the Latin 
American data is the reverse of that found in the industrial countries; the 
fiscal balance  is less,  not  more,  sensitive  to output  fluctuations  during 
bad  times.  This  difference  is not  statistically  significant,  but if one  fo- 
cuses  on deep  recessions  it becomes  more evident.  For this we  defined 
deep  recessions  as episodes  during which real GDP declined by more than 
1.5% (industrial  countries)  or 4.0%  (Latin America);  in  the  years  for 
which  we  have  fiscal data there were  13 such episodes  in our sample  of 
industrial countries  and 18 in our Latin American sample. 
These  episodes  are displayed  in  Figure 1, which  illusrates  the  close 
comovement  of  fiscal balances  and  the  real economy  in the  industrial 
economies  and the very weak relationship in Latin America. Table 9 gives 
some  summary  statistics for the episodes  in Figure 1. During the typical 
deep  recession,  industrial-country  real  GDP  declines  by  nearly  3.5% 
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Table  9  REAL  GDP AND THE  FISCAL  BALANCE  IN DEEP  RECESSIONS 
Industrial  Latin 
economies  America 
Average change in real GDP (%)  -3.3  -10.2 
Average change in the fiscal surplus (%  of GDP)  -4.4  2 
t-statistic  for the change in the fiscal surplus  3.2  1.9 
In Latin America the typical deep  recession  involves  a decline  in real 
GDP of more than 10% while  the fiscal balance has,  on average,  moved 
toward  surplus  by a full 2% of GDP. While there is substantial variation 
across episodes,  this swing  into surplus is statistically significant at con- 
ventional  confidence  levels. 
So far we  have  focused  on  the  behavior  of the  fiscal balance  of the 
general government.  The patterns that we have identified  are similar for 
the central government  and the nonfinancial  public sector. As might be 
expected,  we  find  that local government  balances  display  only  a weak 
relationship  to economic  fluctuations  in both  the  industrial  economies 
and  Latin America,  though  there  is  some  evidence  of  countercyclical 
movements  in local-government  fiscal balances  of the industrial econo- 
mies,  especially  in bad times.  We also find that the surplus of nonfinan- 
cial public enterprises  is negatively  related to economic  activity in Latin 
America,  thus reinforcing the procyclicality of fiscal policy at the level of 
the nonfinancial  public sector. One  interpretation of this finding is that 
public-sector  pricing  and  employment  policies  have  been  used  as  a 
mechanism  to provide  subsidies  to workers and users of public services, 
and that the subsidies  provided  in this way have, like explicit budgetary 
subsidies,  been  provided  in a procyclical manner. 
4.1.2  Public Spending Is Particularly  Procyclical  in Latin America  In Table 
10 we  explore  the  cyclical  properties  of  major spending  and  revenue 
items.  Columns  1 and 2 of that table report the relationship between  real 
GDP growth  and the growth rate of the budgetary aggregate in a regres- 
sion  that also includes  the growth  rate of the terms of trade, the lagged 
fiscal balance,  and country dummy  variables. Fiscal revenue  increases in 
rough  proportion  to  GDP  growth,  in  both  countries,  though  there  is 
some  indication  that revenue  is more sensitive  to economic  fluctuations 
in Latin America than in the industrial economies. 
This difference  is minor,  however,  in comparison  with  differences  in 
the behavior of spending  in the two regions.  In the industrial economies 
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Table  10  CYCLICAL  PROPERTIES  OF REVENUE  AND SPENDING 
Elasticity 
GDP growth, good  GDP growth, bad 
Real GDP growth  times  times 
Industrial  Latin  Industrial  Latin  Industrial  Latin 
economies  America economies America economies America 
Total  revenue  0.93  1.36  0.916  1.20  0.988  1.60 
(11.85)  (8.92)  (9.56)  (5.20)  (3.43)  (5.3) 
Nontax  0.29  0.88  0.352  0.39  -.067  1.62 
revenue  (1.01)  (2.21)  (1.02)  (0.65)  (-0.06)  (2.05) 
Tax  revenue  0.96  1.51  0.976  1.23  0.854  1.94 
(9.44)  (9.44)  (10.76)  (5.09)  (3.04)  (6.09) 
Total  expendi-  0.09  1.09  0.277***  0.77*  -0.892***  1.58* 
ture  (1.23)  (6.85)  (3.177)  (3.22)  (-3.30)  (4.99) 
Capital  expen-  0.21  2.32  0.104  1.73  0.799  3.16 
diture  (0.40)  (6.62)  (0.16)  (3.23)  (0.40)  (4.62) 
Government  0.30  1.24  0.400**  0.96  -0.238**  1.64 
consumption  (4.24)  (7.98)  (4.72)  (4.03)  (-0.91)  (5.43) 
Subsidies and  -0.24  0.58  0.003***  0.37  -1.373***  0.88 
transfers  (-2.33)  (1.73)  (0.02)  (0.72)  (-3.56)  (1.34) 
General  government,  growth  rates  of spending  and revenue.  Elasticities  with respect  to GDP  growth  in a 
regression  that also includes the growth  rate  of the terms  of trade,  the lagged fiscal  balance,  and country 
dummy variables.  t-Statistics  are given in parentheses.  Asterisks  indicate  that the difference  between the 
coefficients  for output growth in good and bad times is statistically  significant  at the 10%  (*),  5%  (**)  and 
1%  (***)  confidence  levels. 
with  slightly  procyclical  government  consumption  being  offset  by  the 
countercyclical behavior of government  subsidies  and transfers. In Latin 
America,  however,  total  expenditure  and  its  components  are  highly 
procyclical. This suggests  that the procyclicality of Latin American fiscal 
policy  is related to policy  responses,  not differences  in the relationship 
between  fiscal revenue  and the cycle. 
Table 10 also  documents  interesting  asymmetries  in the  behavior  of 
government  spending.15 In the industrial  economies,  government  con- 
sumption  is moderately  procyclical in good  times,  while  capital spend- 
ing  and transfers are roughly  uncorrelated  with  economic  fluctuations. 
During bad times,  however,  government  consumption  and transfers dis- 
play  a pronounced  countercyclical  pattern-the  deeper  the  recession, 
the higher  the spending.  It is thus the behavior of public spending,  not 
revenue,  that explains  the more pronounced  countercyclical behavior of 
the fiscal balance in the industrial economies. 
15. There is little evidence  of asymmetry  in the behavior of fiscal revenues  for either Latin 
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In Latin America  there  is  some  evidence  of asymmetric  behavior  in 
public spending,  but rather than becoming countercyclical, public spend- 
ing  appears  to  become  even  more  procyclical  during  bad  economic 
times.  Recessions  are thus associated  with exaggerated collapses  in pub- 
lic spending. 
4.1.3  Cyclical Properites  of the Inflation Tax  It is by now  conventional  to 
view  inflation  as a fiscal phenomenon,  and in that context it is natural 
to investigate  the  cyclical properties  of the  inflation  tax rate. Here  too 
we  find important  differences  from the industrial economies.16 The first 
two  columns  of Table 11 summarize  the cyclical properties  of the infla- 
tion  tax in Latin American  and  the industrial  economies.  We find that 
in the industrial  countries,  the inflation tax rate tends  to increase when 
growth  is  rapid-consistent,  perhaps,  with  something  like  a  Phillips 
curve. In Latin America the opposite  is true-inflation  tends  to acceler- 
ate  when  output  growth  is low.  Thus,  reinforcing  the  procyclical pat- 
tern found  in the  rest of the budget,  the inflation  tax tends  to become 
more contractionary  during periods  of slow  economic  growth  and con- 
versely. There is also some  evidence  that this pattern is stronger during 
bad times than in good  times  (see columns  3 and 4 of Table 11), though 
the difference  in the estimated  coefficients  is not statistically significant. 
This  strong  link between  inflation  and  the  macroeconomy  helps  ex- 
plain  the  strong  procyclicality  of  public  spending  in  Latin America, 
where bad times are associated  with a burst of high inflation that erodes 
the real value  of public  spending  commitments  that are set in nominal 
terms, or at least imperfectly indexed  to the price level. 
It is  also  noteworthy  that  in  Latin America  high  fiscal  deficits  are 
strongly  associated  with  subsequent  increases  in the inflation rate, un- 
like  in  the  industrial  economies,  where  there  is  a weaker  (but never- 
theless  somewhat  puzzling)  relationship  between  fiscal  balances  and 
subsequent  movements  in inflation  of the opposite  sign.  This suggests 
that inflation has acted much more like an instrument  of fiscal policy in 
Latin America than it has in the industrial economies. 
Policymakers may not, of course, have viewed  things that way. In fact, 
we shall provide  evidence  below  that fiscal deficits have been associated 
with  higher  inflation  at least in part because  they have led to a burst of 
16. The  inflation  tax rate is  defined  here  as  the  inflation  rate divided  by  one  plus  the 
inflation rate; this gives the (percentage) erosion of the real value of nominal assets due 
to inflation.  Focusing  on this tax rate, which  is of course bounded  below  one,  has the 
advantage  of reducing  the  extreme  skewness  caused  by hyperinflationary  outliers  in 
our  data  set.  Our  measure  of  inflation  is  the  December-to-December  change  in  the 
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Table  11  CYCLICAL  PROPERTIES  OF THE  INFLATION  TAX 
OLS  coefficients 
Good  and  bad  times 
Overall  distinguished 
Industrial  Latin  Industrial  Latin 
economies  America  economies  America 
Real  GDP growth  0.291  -0.603 
(5.59)  (-5.72) 
Real GDP growth: good  times (b)  --  0.319  -0.466 
(5.01)  (-2.93) 
Real GDP growth: bad times (bl)  --  0.154  -0.812 
(0.83)  (-3.88) 
Percent  change in terms of trade  -0.136  0.000  -0.134  0.001 
(-6.69)  (0.01)  (-6.56)  (0.03) 
Lagged fiscal  balance  0.159  -0.612  0.158  -0.623 
(3.79)  (-4.43)  (3.77)  (-4.5) 
Lagged  inflation tax rate  -0.299  -0.284  -0.297  -0.283 
(-8.02)  (-7.60)  (-7.95)  (-7.58) 
Degrees of freedom  319  267  318  266 
Adjusted R2  0.303  0.215  0.302  0.216 
Significance,  bo = b,  0.44  0.25 
Dependent  variable is the change  in the inflation tax rate. t-Statistics are given in parentheses.  Country 
dummy  variables are included  in all regressions. 
inflation  associated  with  the  abandonment  of  fixed-exchange-rate  re- 
gimes.  But, whether  the link between  inflation and the budget  is adver- 
tent  or the  endogenous  result  of  financial  crises  associated  with  large 
fiscal imbalances,  the end result is similar. 
4.1.4  Inflation and the Budget  These  results  raise the question  whether 
the procyclicality of fiscal outcomes  in Latin America is due primarily to 
the procylicality of the inflation tax, shocks to which erode the real value 
of  nominal  spending  commitments.  Persson,  Persson,  and  Svensson 
(1996) have recently argued that in Sweden  an unanticipated  increase in 
the rate of inflation  could  generate  a large reduction in the real value of 
public spending,  and increase in the fiscal surplus,  because  so much of 
spending  is  effectively  unindexed.  Is a similar mechanism  at work  in 
Latin America? Is fiscal policy a monetary phenomenon? 
We lacked the information  required to conduct  the structural analysis 
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able to conduct  for Sweden,  but instead  asked whether  inflationary sur- 
prises17 helped  predict  fiscal outcomes  in the  region,  and whether  the 
procyclicality  that we  described  above remains evident  after an attempt 
is made  to control for the impact of inflationary shocks  on the budget. 
The results  should  be interpreted  with  caution, because  there is at least 
as much reason to expect that fiscal shocks affect inflation as the reverse; 
but some  results  are nevertheless  worth  reporting.  First, we  found  that 
in Latin America a shock to the inflation tax rate is associated with signi- 
ficantly  lower  growth  in  real  public  spending,  particularly on  public 
consumption  and  capital spending.  However,  it is also associated  with 
significantly  lower  revenues,  perhaps  reflecting the well-known  Tanzi- 
Oliveira effect of inflation on fiscal revenue.  The net result is a deteriora- 
tion of the fiscal balance,  not an improvement,  whereas  a similar analy- 
sis for the industrial economies  suggests  that an inflationary surprise is 
associated  with  a larger fiscal surplus.  Finally, and most  important  for 
our purposes,  the  estimated  relationship  between  fiscal outcomes  and 
real output  growth  was  largely unaffected  by the inclusion  of the infla- 
tion shock; inflation  may be one  mechanism  by which  procyclical fiscal 
outcomes  are generated,  but it is not the only one. 
4.2 INTERPRETATIONS:  WHY  HAS FISCAL  POLICY  BEEN 
PROCYCLICAL  IN LATIN  AMERICA? 
4.2.1  A Neoclassical Explanation  The much  weaker correlation between 
fiscal surpluses  and macroeconomic  fluctuations in Latin America would 
be consistent  with  the neoclassical  approach to fiscal policy if economic 
fluctuations  were  much  more  persistent  in  Latin America  than  in  the 
industrial  economies.  This is not,  however,  the case; the persistence  of 
movements  in real GDP growth is in fact slightly lower in Latin America 
than in the industrial economies.18 
4.2.2  A Keynesian  Explanation  The comovement  of fiscal outcomes  and 
economic  activity  differs  sharply in Latin America and the OECD, and 
Latin American  patterns  seem  at variance  with  normative  theories  of 
17. Our measure  of the inflation  surprise is the residual from a regression  of the inflation 
tax  on  its  lag,  country  dummy  variables,  lagged  output  growth,  the  lagged  fiscal 
surplus,  and contemporaneous  and lagged  changes  in the terms of trade. 
18. When  we  regressed  real GDP  growth  on  lagged  GDP growth  and  country  dummy 
variables,  the coefficient  on lagged  GDP growth was  .353 in Latin America and .401 in 
the industrial  economies.  The difference  is not  statistically significant,  but the coeffi- 
cients are estimated  precisely  enough  to rule out the hypothesis  that shocks to output 
are substantially  more  persistent  in Latin America than  in the industrial  economies. 
There is also  somewhat  less  persistence  in the Latin American terms of trade than in 
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optimal fiscal policy. What explains this procyclicality? We can think of at 
least three potential explanations.  The first and arguably most obvious  is 
that we  have  the  causality  wrong:  that in Latin America fiscal contrac- 
tions  are  causing  declines  in  economic  activity  through  some  sort  of 
Keynesian  mechanism,  and  that  the  positive  association  that  we  see 
between  fiscal  policy  and  output  growth  represents  the  influence  of 
changes  in fiscal policy on the level of economic  activity, rather than the 
reverse.  We think  that this  is probably part of the  story, at least in the 
sense  that the  procyclical fiscal policy  has  amplified  economic  fluctua- 
tions,  and we  would  certainly not want  to argue that there have  never 
been cases in which  an exogenous  fiscal contraction created an economic 
downturn,  or conversely. 
However,  we  do  not  think  this  is  the  whole  story.  It does  not,  for 
example,  explain  the  asymmetry  between  good  and bad times  that we 
observe  in  the  data.  It is  also  not  fully  supported  by  our  reading  of 
important  episodic  evidence.  Consider,  for example,  the experiences  of 
Argentina  and Mexico  during  1995. Both countries  were  hit by a major 
shock at the end of 1994. Reasonable observers disagree about the under- 
lying  cause  of the crisis, but nobody,  to our knowledge,  has suggested 
that it resulted  from an exogenous  tightening  of fiscal policy in the two 
countries.  However,  the recessionary  impact of the shock put pressure 
on both  countries'  public finances,  and in the absence  of a fiscal policy 
response  would  have resulted  in substantial fiscal deficits. The prospect 
of such  deficits  contributed  to the financial panic that threatened  these 
(and,  briefly, other)  countries  in the  first half of  1995, and  to reassure 
investors  fiscal authorities  in both countries  announced  major fiscal re- 
trenchments,  in the midst  of what was by then quite obviously  going  to 
be a year of deep  recession.  While this procyclical fiscal response  almost 
certainly magnified  the recessionary impact of the initial shock, the fiscal 
contraction  was  not  the underlying  cause  of the recession,  but was  in- 
stead  the best  response  of policymakers  to the  economic  and  financial 
environment  created  by  the  recession,  given  the  country's  precarious 
access to financial markets. 
The "tequila"crisis of 1995 was  special in some  respects,  but we  sug- 
gest  that the  procyclical fiscal response  to the economic  downturn  has 
been  a typical  feature  of the  Latin American business  cycle.  Whatever 
the underlying  cause  of an economic  downturn,  it frequently generates 
doubts about the viability of the public finances,  leading to a curtailment 
of  the  noninflationary  finance  required  to run a countercyclical  policy 
and often eliciting a procyclical fiscal contraction. We shall have more to 
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4.2.3  Voracity  Effects  A second  class of explanations  for the procyclical- 
ity  of  fiscal  policy  is  based  upon  political-economic  interactions  that 
explain overspending  of transitory shocks to fiscal revenue.19 In Velasco 
(1994) and Torell  and Lane (1997), for example,  the voracity effect arises 
because  of a fiscal commons  problem.  If the various interest groups that 
compete  for a share of tax revenue  view  fiscal resources  as a common 
pool,  each group will be unwilling  to reduce its claim on a surge in fiscal 
revenue,  knowing  that the benefits of this moderation will largely accrue 
to other interest groups.  Talvi and Vegh (1996) consider a setup in which 
a benevolent  social planner  sets  tax rate optimally, taking into account, 
however,  that any fiscal surpluses  that result will generate political pres- 
sures that result in higher, wasteful  public spending.  The social planner 
must  trade  off  the  benefits  of  tax smoothing  against  the  costs  of  this 
wasteful  spending.  They show  that the social planner will respond  to a 
transitory  revenue  boom  by  lowering  tax rates,  thus  running  smaller 
fiscal  surpluses  than  would  be  called  for in  a world  without  political 
distortions,  while  the political distortion generates  higher public spend- 
ing during the boom.  Similarly, an adverse fiscal shock leads to increased 
taxes  and  lower  public  spending.  In  a  two-period  model  with  three 
income  groups,  Perotti (1996) shows  that in poor economies  character- 
ized by high  inequality  in the distribution  of income,  a transitory, posi- 
tive  shock  could  be  all consumed  in  the  first period,  and  would  also 
generate a larger budget  deficit. This feature is due to the interplay of the 
three groups,  with the two groups at the extremes of the income distribu- 
tion forming  a coalition in favor of very high  deficits,  at the expense  of 
the  middle  group.  According  to  Dornbusch  and  Edwards  (1990) and 
Sachs (1989), this was a feature of many episodes  of populist  policies in 
Latin America. 
4.2.4  The  Role of Borrowing  Constraints  While the evidence  that we have 
provided  here  certainly  falls  short  of  a test  for the  existence  of  such 
voracity effects and the political mechanisms  upon which they rely, such 
effects  seem  to  us  to be  plausible  explanations  for the  strong  link be- 
tween  public  spending  and  the business  cycle,  particularly as explana- 
tions  for  the  public-spending  boom  that  accompanies  good  macro- 
economic  times.  However,  we  do not think that they are the end of the 
story. Our view  is that fiscal policymakers  in Latin America have  typi- 
cally  faced  a  loss  of  confidence  and  thus  intensified  borrowing  con- 
19. Eichengreen,  Hausmann,  and von  Hagen  (1996) lay out in more detail potential  links 
between  such policy distortions  and their implications  for fiscal policymaking  in Latin 
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straints  during  bad  macroeconomic  times.  The  loss  of  market  access 
makes  it impossible  to run a countercyclical fiscal policy, at least in bad 
times.  A  full  description  of  Latin American  fiscal  outcomes  needs  to 
account for this precarious  creditworthiness.20 
The idea that borrowing  constraints  tend  to be reinforced during bad 
times provides  an explanation why fiscal policy is particularly procyclical 
during  such  times;  authorities  might  like  to  implement  more  coun- 
tercyclical fiscal policies,  but they  are prevented  from doing  so by their 
inability  to  finance  the  implied  fiscal  deficits.21 The  precariousness  of 
Latin American  governments'  access  to noninflationary  finance of fiscal 
imbalances  also  helps  explain  why  fiscal deficits  are less  persistent  in 
Latin America  than in the industrial countries-we  view  it as evidence 
that financial  markets  keep  Latin American  governments  on  a shorter 
financial leash than they provide to governments  in the industrial coun- 
tries. And the very high sensitivity  of inflation to economic  fluctuations, 
especially  in bad times,  and to fiscal imbalances  is also consistent  with 
this view;  if one  views  inflation  as a fiscal resource  of last resort, then 
sudden  bursts  of inflation  during  bad  times  offer support  for the  idea 
that alternative financing  sources have become  much more scarce. 
There is more direct evidence  for the idea that borrowing  constraints 
have intensified  during bad times and have played  an important role in 
reinforcing  the  procyclicality  of fiscal policy  in Latin America.22 While 
such  constraints  cannot  be observed  directly, their presence  can be in- 
ferred from the use of emergency  credit. In the balance-of-payments  statis- 
tics reported  by the International  Monetary  Fund,  two  such  sources  of 
credit appear: IMF credit, which is typically provided only when  alterna- 
tive sources  of financing  have become  much more scarce, and extraordi- 
nary credit, which  comprises  arrears and  special  financing  operations 
such as the U.S. Treasury's support for Mexico during 1995. 
To see whether  the use of such credit is associated  with the bad times 
during  which  we  find  fiscal  policy  to  be  particularly  procyclical,  we 
20. See Gavin et al. (1996) for an extended  discussion  of the economic  consequences  of and 
policy  responses  to this precarious creditworthiness. 
21. Gavin and Perotti (1996) provide evidence  that the private as well as the public sector in 
Latin America has been afflicted by tighter borrowing constraints during bad times.  In 
the industrial economies  private saving is positively  correlated with output shocks and 
shocks  to public saving,  both consistent  with  consumption-smoothing  behavior if the 
shocks  are perceived  as partly transitory. In Latin America this pattern is observed  in 
good  times,  but  not  in bad,  which  is consistent  with  the  idea  that in bad times  the 
private sector is unable to obtain the access to credit required to smooth  consumption. 
22. It would  seem  natural  to  investigate  the  behavior  of  real interest  rates  during  bad 
times.  Unfortunately,  in many  countries  for much  of our sample,  domestic  financial 
markets were heavily  regulated.  Also,  as we argued above, inflation tends to be higher 
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regressed  the use of such credit (measured as a share of exports of goods 
and  services)  on  country  dummy  variables and a dummy  variable that 
takes  the  value  one  when  the  country  is  experiencing  bad  times,  as 
defined  above.  The  coefficient  on  the bad-times  dummy  variable thus 
represents  the amount by which the use of this emergency  finance tends 
to increase in bad times, compared with normal times in a given country. 
As  Table 12 indicates,  there  is a strong  positive  correlation between 
bad times  and the use  of such  emergency  finance,  suggesting  that bad 
times are indeed  times of intensified  borrowing constraints. 
Is there  evidence  that  these  borrowing  constraints  contribute  to the 
procyclicality  of  fiscal  policy  in  Latin America?  Such  borrowing  con- 
straints  ultimately  derive  from investors'  fears that a fiscal deficit will 
become  unmanageable  and  lead  to  default.  If they  are an  important 
explanation  for the  procyclicality  of  fiscal policy,  one  would  therefore 
expect  that countries  with  high  initial deficits would  display  more pro- 
nounced  procyclicality than countries  that enter a period with low fiscal 
deficits.  To investigate  this  we  re-estimated  the  relationship  between 
output  growth  and the fiscal balance,  allowing  the relationship  to differ 
depending  upon  whether  fiscal deficits  were  large (greater than 3% of 
GDP) or small in the preceding  year. The results,  summarized  in Table 
'13, provide  some  support  for the  significance  of credit constraints.  We 
found  that in Latin American countries  that enter a year with low fiscal 
deficits,  the  fiscal balance  responds  to  output  shocks  in a moderately 
countercyclical  manner-the  point  estimate  is  that  a one-percentage- 
Table  12  USE  OF EXTRAORDINARY 
FINANCE  DURING  BAD  TIMES 
Coefficient 
Industrial  Latin 
economies  America 
IMF  credit  .001  .014 
(0.84)  (2.49) 
Extraordinary  finance  .000  .052 
(0.06)  (2.63) 
Total  .000  .066 
(0.05)  (3.03) 
Dependent variable  is measured as a share of exports of 
goods and services. Reported  statistics are the estimated 
coefficient  on a dummy variable  that takes the value one 
during  bad times, as defined  in the text, and zero  otherwise. 
t-Statistics  are given in parentheses.  Country  dummy vari- 
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Table  13  CYCLICAL  PROPERTIES  OF THE  FISCAL  BALANCE:  DOES  THE 
INITIAL  DEFICIT  MATTER? 
Coefficient 
Industrial  Latin 
economies  America 
Real  GDP growth, low initial  deficit  .359  .115 
(9.21)  (2.36) 
Real  GDP growth, high initial  deficit  .392  -.057 
(6.80)  (-1.01) 
Change in terms of trade (%)  .034  .014 
(2.35)  (1.15) 
Lagged fiscal balance  -.167  -.330 
(-4.96)  (-5.94) 
Degrees of freedom  313  256 
Adjusted R2  .284  .101 
Significance: bo =  b,  .596  .018 
Dependent  variable is the change  in the surplus,  measured  as a share of GDP. t-Statistics are given  in 
parentheses.  Country dummy  variables are included  in all regressions. 
point increase in GDP growth  is associated  with an increase in the fiscal 
surplus of 0.11 percentage  points,  and this estimate is significantly differ- 
ent  from  zero  at  conventional  confidence  levels.  However,  in  Latin 
American countries  that enter a period with high fiscal deficits, the fiscal 
balance responds  negatively  to output  shocks,  and while  the estimated 
coefficient is not significantly  different from zero, the hypothesis  that the 
cyclical sensitivity  does  not depend  upon initial deficit can be rejected at 
high confidence  levels. 
In the  industrial  economies,  in  contrast,  there  is  essentially  no  evi- 
dence  that initial deficit matters,  suggesting  that borrowing  constraints 
have not been  a factor in industrial-country  public finance. 
5.  Fiscal  Policy, the Exchange  Regime,  and Economic 
Instability 
Thus far, we have provided  evidence  that fiscal policy behaves  very dif- 
ferently in Latin American countries  than in the industrial economies- 
fiscal  outcomes  have  been  much  more  volatile,  and  have  displayed  a 
pronounced  cyclical pattern that contrasts sharply with  fiscal outcomes 
in the industrial economies.  If, as we argue, credit constraints play a role 
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the  macroeconomic  environment  that characterizes the region  is a key 
determinant  of the  procyclicality of Latin American  fiscal policy; credit 
constraints promote  procyclicality only to the extent that the underlying 
macroeconomic  environment  is volatile enough  periodically to force the 
economy  into  the  constrained  regime.  Of course,  the causality  runs in 
both directions,  for the procyclicality of fiscal policy in turn exacerbates 
the instability in the underlying  macroeconomic  environment.23 
From a policy  perspective,  one way  for a country to cut this Gordian 
knot is to introduce  institutions  that can better tie the hands  of undisci- 
plined  policymakers.  For  small  open  economies  like  those  of  Latin 
America,  among  the  most  prominent  of such  institutional  restraints is 
the  exchange-rate  regime.  The  use-and  the  associated  theory-of 
exchange-rate  regimes  as a way to constrain monetary policy has a long 
history  in  Latin America.  As  inflation  subsided  everywhere  in  the  re- 
gion,  a  second  dimension  has  attracted increasing  attention,  in  both 
theoretical and policy circles: the role of exchange-rate regimes as mech- 
anisms  to secure the fiscal restraint required for a lasting inflation stabi- 
lization.  In this  section,  we  explore  the  link between  fiscal policy,  the 
exchange-rate  regime,  and economic  instability. 
We wish  to be explicit from the outset  about what we hope  to achieve 
in this section.  As in everything  that we have done so far, reverse causal- 
ity is a serious  potential  problem  here.  We have not completely  solved 
this problem  and are, in fact, skeptical that anybody  will ever convinc- 
ingly do so. Our goal is to present the basic facts, and elicit from them as 
much  information  as possible  without  doing  violence  to the data, bear- 
ing in mind  the limitations  imposed  by the limited  degrees  of freedom 
available for this exercise.  Despite  these  limitations,  we believe  that the 
data speak  clearly enough  to seriously  undermine  the plausibility  of a 
wide  range of seriously  considered  hypotheses. 
We ask two  types  of questions.  First, is there any evidence  that the 
exchange-rate  regime disciplines  fiscal policy? As the answer appears to 
be  no,  we  then  explore  the  relationship  between  fiscal  policy  and 
switches  between  regimes.  We have  two  motivations  here.  First, we 
study  the behavior  of fiscal policy in the years surrounding  a change  in 
the  exchange  rate regime  to obtain  sharper insights  into  the  potential 
disciplining  efforts of alternative exchange-rate regimes. We then investi- 
gate  the  empirical  association  between  fiscal  policy  and  subsequent 
changes  in  the  exchange-rate  regime,  focusing  on  episodes  in  which 
23. Gavin et al. (1996) lay out an argument for a vicious cycle of volatility and procylicality. 
Aizenman,  Gavin,  and  Hausmann  (1996) formalize  this  idea.  Talvi and  Vegh  (1996) 
derive  a link between  macroeconomic  volatility and procyclical fiscal policy through  a 
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fixed  exchange  rates  have  been  abandoned  in  favor  of  more  flexible 
regimes. 
5.1 DO FIXED  EXCHANGE  RATES  PROMOTE  FISCAL  DISCIPLINE? 
There is a substantial tradition, arguably even a conventional  wisdom,  to 
the  effect  that  fixed  exchange  rates  generate  more  discipline  than  do 
flexible  rates.24 Argentina's  commitment  to a pegged  exchange  rate- 
popular  because  it  is  associated  in  the  popular  imagination  with  the 
elimination  of that country's  hyperinflation-is  often cited as in impor- 
tant factor in generating  political support  for responsible  fiscal policies. 
Unlike many  pieces  of conventional  wisdom,  this one is not innocuous, 
and  has  actually  been  known  to  affect  policy.  The  recent  (and  short- 
lived)  Bucaram government  in Ecuador proposed  as a centerpiece  of its 
(even shorter-lived)  economic  strategy an Argentine-style  "convertibility 
plan," with the explicit objective of securing therewith a political commit- 
ment  to fiscal  discipline,  and  a currency board has  recently  been  pro- 
posed  by  the  International  Monetary  Fund  for Bulgaria as a means  of 
providing  the fiscal discipline  that is now  lacking in that country. 
Recently, however,  Tornell and Velasco (1995) have suggested  that the 
theoretical  case  for this  conventional  wisdom  is weak.  In their model 
fixed exchange  rates promote  greater fiscal discipline if policymakers are 
patient,  whereas  flexible exchange  rates promote fiscal discipline  if poli- 
cymakers are impatient.  The idea is that lax fiscal policy generates  infla- 
tion under both fixed and flexible exchange rates-the  main difference is 
that  it does  so  immediately  under  flexible  exchange  rates and  after a 
potentially  long  delay  under  fixed  rates.  Impatient  governments  are 
more heavily  influenced  by the short term, so that the immediate  infla- 
tion generated  by lax fiscal policy under flexible exchange rates provides 
a more effective  deterrent to fiscal indiscipline  than the delayed  inflation 
that would  be generated  under fixed rates. 
Tornell and  Velasco  also  provide  suggestive  evidence  that  fixed  ex- 
change  rates  do  not  promote  fiscal  discipline,  arguing  that exchange- 
rate-based  stabilizations  have  not,  in general,  enjoyed  more success  in 
securing  a fiscal adjustment  than have money-based  stabilizations.  Our 
data set  permits  a more  direct test  of the hypothesis.  We begin  with  a 
naive  approach  to  the  question,  simply  asking  whether,  on  average, 
Latin American  countries  have  tended  to  have  higher  or lower  fiscal 
deficits  under  fixed  exchange  rates.  To answer  this  question,  we  re- 
24. See,  for example,  Giavazzi and Pagano (1988). Edwards (1992) provides  empirical evi- 
dence  that countries  that began  the  1980s with  fixed exchange  rates experienced,  on 
average,  lower inflation rates over the subsequent  decade.  He did not provide evidence 
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Table 14  ARE FIXED EXCHANGE RATES ASSOCIATED WITH INCREASED 
FISCAL DISCIPLINE? 
Coefficient 
Overall  Primary  Revenue  Total 
surplus  surplus  and grants  expenditure 
Specification  1 
General government:  -.010  -.014  -.002  .006 
Latin America  (-1.58)  (-2.15)  (-0.47)  (1.00) 
Industrial economies  .001  .002  .005  .005 
(0.28)  (0.38)  (1.64)  (1.46) 
Nonfinancial  public sector:  -.021  -.023  -.006  .008 
Latin America  (-2.39)  (-2.57)  (-0.84)  (1.11) 
Industrial economies  -  - 
Specification  2 
General government:  -.007  -.015  -.008  .001 
Latin America  (-1.22)  (-2.27)  (-1.56)  (.015) 
Industrial economies  .004  .004  -.008  -.007 
(1.01)  (1.11)  (-2.30)  (-2.18) 
Nonfinancial  public sector:  -.022  -.028  -.009  .010 
Latin America  (-2.45)  (-2.97)  (-1.39)  (1.52) 
Industrial economies 
Specifications  are described  in the text. Statistic  reported  is the coefficent  on a dummy variable  that 
takes the value one during periods when the economy is operating  under fixed exchange  rates and 
zero otherwise. t-Statistics  are given in parentheses. Country  dummy variables  are included in all 
regressions. 
gressed  a number  of fiscal outcomes,  measured  as a share of GDP, on 
country  dummy  variables and a dummy  variable that is equal to one  if 
the  economy  was  operating  under  a  fixed  exchange  rate  during  the 
year,  and  zero  otherwise.25 These  regressions  are simply  intended  to 
display  in  a  compact  way  the  summary  statistics  on  fiscal  outcomes 
under  different  exchange  regimes,  after accounting  in a crude way  for 
country-specific  factors.  The  results  of  this  estimation  are reported  in 
Table 14, as specification  1. 
The results contradict the conventional  wisdom.  In Latin America, for 
both the general government  and, more strongly, the nonfinancial public 
sector,  fixed  exchange  rates are associated  with  lower  fiscal surpluses, 
25. The source of the data is the International  Monetary  Fund's Exchange  and Trade  Rela- 
tions, various  issues.  The variable utilizes  a strict definition  of a fixed exchange  rate, 
including  only  those  exchange-rate  regimes  that the  IMF categorizes  as pegged  to a 
single  currency or a basket  of currencies.  Regimes  categorized  as "limited flexibility" 
are categorized  as flexible. 46 *  GAVIN  & PEROTTI 
both  overall  and  primary, than are flexible exchange-rate  regimes,  and 
the estimated  effect is both economically  and statistically very significant. 
(This does  not hold  for the industrial  economies,  where  the correlation 
between  exchange  regimes  and fiscal outcomes  was  stubbornly negligi- 
ble.) The point estimate suggests  that the overall surplus of the nonfinan- 
cial public sector has tended  to be more than 2 percentage  points higher 
under  flexible  exchange  rates  than  it has  been  under  fixed  exchange 
rates. The contributions  of spending  and revenue  to the impact on the 
overall  deficit  are not  precisely  estimated,  though  the  point  estimates 
suggest  that both contribute to the result in roughly equal measure. 
In the  results  given  under  specification  2 in  Table 14 we  regressed 
the  change  in  the  fiscal  variable on  the  dummy  variable for fixed  ex- 
change  rates, output  growth  in good  times and bad times,  the percent- 
age change in the terms of trade, and the lagged fiscal balance, to control 
for the effects of macroeconomic  conditions  that might be systematically 
linked to the exchange-rate  regime. To address the problem of endogene- 
ity in the exchange-rate  regime,  albeit in a very partial and naive way, we 
instrumented  the dummy  variable for the exchange-rate regime with the 
exchange  regime in the previous  period.26 (We will have more to say on 
the endogeneity  problem below.)  The results again suggest,  and in gen- 
eral  more  strongly,  that  countries  that  operate  under  fixed  exchange 
rates tended  to  experience  substantially  larger deficits  than  those  that 
operated  under flexible exchange  rates. 
5.2 WHAT  CAN BE  LEARNED  FROM  EXCHANGE-REGIME 
SWITCHES? 
We have  seen  that there  is a clear statistical association  between  fixed 
exchange  rates and  large fiscal deficits.  We can think  of three  reasons 
why  this  may  not  reflect  a causal  relationship  from  exchange-rate  re- 
gimes  to  fiscal  outcomes.  First,  it  could  be  that  in  the  sample  fixed 
exchange  rates  happen  to  be  associated  with  a less  favorable  macro- 
economic  environment,  which in turn induces larger fiscal deficits. Since 
we  controlled  for the macroeconomic  environment  in specification  2 of 
Table 14, the evidence  presented  above addresses  this criticism. 
The other  two  reasons  have  to do with  the potential  endogeneity  of 
the  exchange-rate  regime.  First, it might  be  that a policymaker  with  a 
penchant  for  fiscal  indiscipline  would  choose  a  fixed-exchange-rate 
regime  because  it facilitates  the  pursuit  of  this  policy.  In the  Tornell- 
Velasco framework,  for example,  it seems  likely  that impatient  policy- 
26. The  results  do  not  differ  substantially  if  instead  we  estimate  using  ordinary  least 
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makers  would  not  only  tend  to  run  more  expansionary  fiscal  policy 
than  would  patient  policymakers,  but,  given  the  choice,  would  also 
choose  to  operate  under  a  fixed-exchange-rate  regime,  because  that 
regime  lowers  the  perceived  costs  (to  the  policymaker)  of  fiscal  in- 
discipline.  Note,  however,  that  this  source  of  joint  endogeneity  does 
not contradict the line of causality running  from fixed exchange  rates to 
fiscal  indiscipline,  but  depends  on  it; in  the  absence  of  a causal  link 
from the exchange  rate regime to fiscal laxity, undisciplined  policymak- 
ers would  have  no  reason  to choose  fixed exchange  rates. If this is the 
story  about  endogeneity  of the  exchange  regime,  then  the  statistically 
significant  correlation  between  fiscal  outcomes  and  the  exchange  re- 
gime  that we  document  would  provide  evidence  for the existence  of a 
causal  link  from  the  exchange  regime  to  fiscal  outcomes,  though  it 
would  not provide  meaningful  evidence  on the magnitude  of the fiscal 
impact of imposing  a specific regime on a policymaker, for example,  by 
constitutional  amendment. 
This brings us to the third possibility,  which  is that some  unobserved 
political or economic  variable causes policymakers to choose both a fixed 
exchange  rate and a loose  fiscal policy (and conversely),  despite  the ab- 
sence  of any causal relationship  between  the exchange  regime  and the 
fiscal policymaking  process.  In contrast to the previous case, where poli- 
cymakers cared about the exchange-rate regime only because of its effect 
on the costs  and benefits  associated  with alternative fiscal policies,  here 
the policymaker is assumed  to have preferences over both fiscal outcomes 
and the exchange-rate  regime. 
Formally, if one  could  condition  on this omitted  variable, the correla- 
tion between  the exchange  regime and fiscal policy should be zero. If the 
shock to this underlying  variable is temporary, then our use of the lagged 
value of the exchange-rate dummy variable as an instrument in specifica- 
tion 2 would  take care of the problem.27 But if shocks to this unobserved 
variable are persistent,  the  lagged  exchange  rate would  not be a valid 
instrument  and  this  procedure  would  be of no help.28 We do not have 
much to say regarding this argument; we do not even  attempt to instru- 
27. Of course, one would also have to assume that there are large costs in changing the 
exchange-rate  regime, so that even if the shock  to preferences  is temporary,  the country 
stays in that regime unless its costs outweigh the costs of changing  the regime. Effec- 
tively, this makes the lagged exchange-rate-regime  dummy variable  an instrument  for 
the current exchange-rate  regime. A slightly different interpretation  is that we are 
measuring the average fiscal outcomes corresponding  to entering each period with a 
given exchange-rate  regime. 
28. We should perhaps  reiterate  that  all of our empirical  work  has included  fixed  effects  for 
countries, so that completely permanent "shocks,"  which would only affect cross- 
country  comparisons,  are not an issue here. 48 *  GAVIN  & PEROTTI 
ment  the  exchange  regime  in this  scenario,  mainly  because,  in the ab- 
sence  of a realistic story about what  the omitted  variable is and how  it 
influences  fiscal policy and the choice of exchange-rate regime, it is hard 
to come up with a list of potential instruments.  Having said this, it seems 
to us that the very difficulty of coming  up with  such a story casts some 
doubt on the empirical significance  of the logical possibility. 
If we  suppose  for the sake of argument  that the exchange-rate  regime 
exerts  a  causal  influence,  one  way  or  the  other,  on  fiscal  discipline, 
there  is  an  issue  of  timing  that  renders  our  results  on  the  long-run 
correlation  between  the  exchange-rate  regime  and  fiscal outcomes  po- 
tentially  misleading.  Suppose,  for example,  that  fixed  exchange  rates 
promote  fiscal  discipline,  and  for that reason  tend  to be chosen  when 
the  fiscal situation  is bad.  Suppose  also  that it generally  takes time for 
the fiscal situation  to be brought  under  control.  In such  a world,  fixed 
exchange  rates might be associated  with  high  fiscal deficits,  despite  the 
fact  that  they  promote  fiscal  discipline,  simply  because  they  tend  to 
inherit  a particularly large fiscal imbalance.  At the  same  time,  flexible 
regimes  could  be  empirically  associated  with  low  fiscal deficits  simply 
because  they  inherit low  deficits left over from the preceding  period  of 
fixed exchange  rates.29 
This is where  evidence  on  timing  can shed  important  light.  If fixed 
exchange  rates impose  fiscal discipline,  we  should  observe  an improve- 
ment  in fiscal outcomes  immediately  after the adoption  of a peg.  Simi- 
larly, if flexible exchange  rates promote  less  fiscal discipline,  we  should 
observe a worsening  of the fiscal outcomes  immediately  after a switch to 
flexible exchange  rates. 
Before looking  at the data, a caveat is in order. In our data set there are 
few  changes  of exchange  regime: 21 changes  from fixed to flexible, and 
11  switches  from  flexible  to  fixed.  Of  the  21  switches  from  fixed  to 
flexible rates, 7 represented  a return to fixed exchange  rates after a very 
brief (one  year) experience  with  flexible rates.  Of the  11 switches  from 
flexible  to  fixed  rates,  7 represent  the  return  to  fixed  exchange  rates 
described  above,  2  others  were  reversed  after a year,  and  1 was  too 
29. While  we think it is important  to address  this potential  concern,  we do not think  that it 
should be taken too seriously. The story requires that the typical duration of an 
exchange-rate  peg be sufficiently  short that the correlation  between fiscal outcomes 
and the exchange  rate regime  is dominated  by the transition  dynamics  described  here, 
rather  than the long-run relationship  between the regime  and fiscal  discipline.  This is 
not the case; although exchange-rate  switches are substantially  more frequent  than in 
the industrial  countries, they are fairly  rare  events. Also, the regressions  reported  as 
specification  2 of Table  14 control  for the initial  fiscal  balance,  reducing  the likelihood 
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Table 15  MACROECONOMIC OUTCOMES AROUND  THE TIME OF 
EXCHANGE-RATE REGIME  SWITCHES 
Coefficient 
% change, 
Real GDP  real exchange 
growth  Inflation  rate 
Fixed to flexible 
1 year before  .004  .165  -.149 
(0.33)  (1.34)  (-1.29) 
Year of the switch  -0.34  .449  .342 
(-2.76)  (3.38)  (2.92) 
1 year after  -.016  .092  -.042 
(-1.28)  (0.72)  (-0.36) 
2 years after  -.000  .037  -.000 
(-0.04)  (0.35)  (-0.00) 
Flexible  to fixed 
1 year before  .012  -.052  -.198 
(0.72)  (-0.30)  (-1.18) 
Year of the switch  .023  -.003  .142 
(1.30)  (-0.01)  (0.84) 
1 year after  .008  -.244  -.109 
(0.49)  (-1.38)  (-0.66) 
2 years after  .030  -.104  .090 
(1.99)  (-0.73)  (0.56) 
Degrees  of freedom  319  307  319 
Adjusted  R2  .082  .556  -.071 
Specifications  are described  in the text. t-Statistics  are given in parentheses.  Country  dummy  variables 
are included in all regressions,  and estimates  correct  for first-order  autocorrelation  of the error  terms. 
recent  to  offer  much  evidence  on  postswitch  outcomes.  This  limited 
experience  means  that the data are unlikely to speak with crystal clarity, 
especially  on the switch from flexible to fixed exchange  rates. 
We begin  in  Table 15 with  a  summary  of  macroeconomic  develop- 
ments  just  before  and  after  the  switches.  The  estimates  in  the  table 
were  constructed  by  regressing  the  dependent  variable  on  country 
dummy  variables and leads and lags of a dummy  variable that takes the 
value  one  in  years  when  there  was  a  switch  between  exchange-rate 
regimes. 
Switches  from  fixed  to  flexible  exchange  rates  look  very  much  like 50 *  GAVIN  & PEROTTI 
crises.  They  are associated  with  higher  than  normal  inflation,  a large 
(35%) depreciation  of the real exchange  rate, and a rate of GDP growth 
which  is nearly  3.5  percentage  points  below  normal,  and  these  effects 
are statistically very significant.  Note also that after the switch from fixed 
to flexible  exchange  rates output  growth  remains  depressed,  although 
the  coefficient  is  not  estimated  very  precisely.  Switches  from fixed  to 
flexible exchange  rates are another  thing altogether; around the time of 
the  switch,  real GDP growth  changes  very little; if anything,  the point 
estimates  suggest  a better than average  performance  in the year of the 
switch  and,  especially,  after the  switch.  Not  surprisingly,  inflation  falls 
somewhat  after the adoption  of the new regime, although once again the 
coefficents  are not precisely  estimated. 
To summarize  this  evidence  on  the  macroeconomic  developments 
around  exchange-rate  regime  switches,  on  average  the  adoption  of  a 
flexible  exchange  rate regime  displays  all the  signs  of the typical crisis 
accompanying  the  abandonment  of  fixed-exchange-rate  regimes.  Sup- 
porting this view  is the finding  (not reported in Table 15) that the use of 
IMF credit (as a share of exports of goods  and services) rises significantly 
during the year of the switch  and in the subsequent  year. On the other 
hand,  switches  to  fixed  exchange  rates  appear  to  be  less  traumatic 
events.  The  evidence  also  helps  dispel  the  notion  that  a worse  fiscal 
performance  after  a  switch  to  a  fixed-exchange-rate  regime  could  be 
largely explained  by worse  macroeconomic  conditions. 
Armed  with  this  preliminary  evidence,  we  now  turn to a more  for- 
mal  analysis  of  fiscal  developments  around  the  exchange-rate  regime 
switches.  We constructed  dummy  variables for years just before and just 
after  the  switch  of  the  regime,  but  set  them  equal  to  1  only  if  the 
exchange-rate  regime  had not reverted  to the original regime.  We then 
regressed  the change  in the overall surplus,  total expenditure,  and total 
revenues  (all  measured  as  shares  of  GDP)  on  these  regime-switch 
dummy  variables.  In the  regression  we  also  controlled  for the  lagged 
fiscal balance,  GDP growth in good  and bad times,  the rate of growth  of 
the  terms  of  trade,  and  country  fixed  effects.  (Conditioning  on  GDP 
growth is particularly important because of the very different behavior of 
GDP growth around the two types of switches  that we have documented 
above.)  Hence,  in principle  we  are isolating  the "discretionary" change 
in  fiscal  policy  typically  associated  with  changes  in  the  exchange-rate 
regime. 
We find  (Table 16) that switches  from fixed- to flexible-exchange-rate 
regimes  tend  to be  preceded  by a period  of high  fiscal deficits,  and  in 
particular by higher  than normal public expenditure.  During the year of 
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Table  16  FISCAL  OUTCOMES  AROUND  THE  TIME  OF EXCHANGE-RATE 
REGIME  SWITCHES 
Coefficient 
Overall  Revenue and  Total 
surplus  grants  expenditure 
Fixed  to  flexible 
1 year before  -.017  .004  .020 
(-2.19)  (0.58)  (2.53) 
Year  of the switch  .012  .010  -.002 
(1.51)  (1.46)  (-0.19) 
1 year after  .021  .005  -.016 
(2.43)  (0.67)  (-1.89) 
2 years after  .010  .001  -.003 
(1.30)  (0.08)  (-0.43) 
Flexible  to  fixed 
1 year before  .011  .002  -.011 
(0.90)  (0.20)  (-0.86) 
Year  of the switch  .023  .007  -.012 
(1.97)  (0.73)  (-1.04) 
1 year after  .020  .007  -.012 
(1.82)  (0.76)  (-1.09) 
2 years after  .010  -.017  -.025 
(0.76)  (-1.53)  (-1.92) 
Degrees of freedom  224  225  224 
Adjusted  R2  .133  -.008  .009 
General  government,  percentage  of GDP. Specifications  are described  in the text. t-Statistics  are given 
in parentheses.  Country  dummy  variables  are  included  in all  regressions,  and estimates  correct  for  first- 
order  autocorrelation  of the error  terms. 
towards  fiscal  surplus,  amounting  to  nearly  4% of  GDP. This  is  also 
driven primarily by changes  in expenditure.30 
This evidence  seems  at first glance to be reasonably good news  for the 
idea that flexible exchange  rates promote greater fiscal discipline in Latin 
America,  perhaps  through  mechanisms  such  as the  ones  described  by 
Tomell and Velasco (1995). Still, we interpret it with caution,  for several 
30. We see  that periods  during which  fixed-exchange-rate  regimes  are abandoned  tend to 
be associated  with economic  contraction and fiscal expansions.  It is interesting to know 
whether  these  episodes  are driving the results on the procyclicality of fiscal policy that 
were  discussed  above.  It turns  out  that  they  are not; if we  exclude  periods  during 
which  the exchange  regime was switched  from the regressions  summarized  in Table 8, 
the point estimates  of the coefficient on output growth are essentially  unchanged. 52 *  GAVIN & PEROTTI 
reasons.  First, a switch  to flexible exchange  rates is likely to be part of a 
package  of  policies  that  may  very  well  include  a fiscal  consolidation, 
even  if there is nQ causal relationship  between  the two.  In addition,  as 
we noted  above,  switches  to flexible exchange  rates tend to occur in the 
context  of a macroeconomic  and financial crisis in which  policymakers 
may be forced into a fiscal adjustment  by curtailed access to credit. The 
fiscal  consolidation  that  tends  to  follow  a switch  to flexible  exchange 
rates may thus have much more to do with unobserved  elements  of the 
short-term  macroeconomic  situation  than with  longer-lasting  political- 
economic  factors.  Finally, we  also  find  that a similar pattern  emerges 
after the  switch  from flexible  to fixed  exchange  rates.  In this  case  the 
fiscal surplus also tends to be relatively high in the year of the switch and 
the year immediately  following  it, though  it does  not increase by much 
compared  with  the surplus  observed  in the year before the switch.  This 
is consistent  with  the idea that alterations in the exchange-rate  regime, 
in  either  direction,  are part of  a policy  package  that tends  to  include 
some  fiscal consolidation. 
Still,  we  have  made  progress.  Notice  that there  is no  evidence  that 
fixed-exchange-rate  regimes  inherit  a  particularly bad  fiscal  situation 
from the preceding  flexible-exchange-rate  regime: the coefficient  of the 
dummy  variable  one  year before  the  switch  to fixed  exchange  rates is 
positive,  although  not statistically different from zero. Similarly, there is 
no evidence  that the  negative  long-run  correlation between  flexible ex- 
change  rates and  fiscal deficits is due  to the fact that they  tend  to start 
from a healthy  fiscal stance; the coefficient of the switch dummy variable 
one  year  before  the  shift  to  flexible  rates is  negative,  and  statistically 
significant.  We can also reject the notion  that fiscal outcomes  are more 
stringent under flexible-exchange-rate  regimes only because the underly- 
ing  economic  environment  is  more  favorable,  since  we  have  tried  to 
partial out  the  effect  of the  economic  environment  on  fiscal outcomes. 
Combined  with  the strong empirical association between  fixed exchange 
rates and  fiscal laxity that we  have  documented  above,  these  findings 
would  seem  to  shift  the  burden  of  the  proof  toward  advocates  of  the 
view  that fixed exchange  rates promote  fiscal discipline. 
5.3 FISCAL  POLICY  AND THE  DEMISE  OF FIXED-EXCHANGE- 
RATE  REGIMES 
We have  presented  evidence  that in Latin America,  though  not in the 
industrial  economies,  fixed-exchange-rate  regimes  are associated  with 
larger fiscal deficits than are flexible regimes.  Regardless of the story that 
one  prefers  about  causality,  this  association  poses  a puzzle;  fixed  ex- 
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lection,31  and  the  combination  of larger  fiscal  deficits  and  lower  inflation 
taxes  does  not  add  up.  What  gives? 
What  gives,  of  course,  is  the  fixed-exchange-rate  regime.  We  have 
found  that  in Latin  America  the  end  of fixed-exchange-rate  regimes  tend 
to be  preceded  by  a major  fiscal  expansion,  and  accompanied  by  signs  of 
a major  economic  and  financial  crisis.32 One  interpretation  of these  find- 
ings  is  that  loose  fiscal  policy  is  an  important  contributor  to  the  collapse 
of  fixed-exchange-rate  regimes.33  In  this  section  we  develop  this  idea 
further.  Our  main  finding  is that  fiscal  policy  is a robust  predictor  of the 
abandonment  of  fixed-exchange  regimes,  though  other  domestic  and 
external  factors  are  also  important.  This  is  noteworthy  because  several 
recent  studies  have  either  failed  to test  for the  impact  of fiscal  variables, 
or  failed  to  uncover  evidence  that  they  are  an  important  factor  in  cur- 
rency  or financial  crises. 
To explore  this,  we  estimated  the  empirical  relationship  between  the 
probability  of a switch  from  fixed  to flexible  exchange  rates  and  a number 
of explanatory  variables,  including  (1) measures  of the  fiscal  stance  in the 
previous  period;  (2)  the  three-year  rate  of  change  in  the  terms  of  trade, 
also  lagged  one  year,  (3) the  three-year  rate of growth  of real GDP, lagged 
one  year;  (4)  the  three-year  rate  of  growth  in  the  real  exchange  rate, 
lagged  one  year;  and  (5)  the  exchange-rate  regime,  lagged  two  years. 
Estimation  is  by  probit,34  and  the  sample  is  of  course  restricted  to  those 
observations  for which  the  previous  year's  exchange  rate  was  fixed.35 
31. Except  in  those  atypical  cases  in  which  the  economy  is  on  the  wrong  side  of  the 
inflation-tax  Laffer curve.  Ghosh  et.  al.  (1997) also  report that inflation  tends  to be 
lower under fixed- than under flexible-exchange-rate  regimes. 
32. In  a  panel  study  of  macroeconomic  volatility  in  about  100  countries,  Gavin  and 
Hausmann  (1996) also  find  that frequent  switches  among  exchange-rate  regimes  are 
associated  with increased  macroeconomic  volatility. 
33. Note that, having explored the potential impact of exchange regimes on fiscal outcomes, 
we now  explore the impact of fiscal outcomes  on (changes in) exchange  regime. We are 
essentially  relying upon  timing considerations  for identification,  assuming  that lagged 
fiscal policy is causally related to the sustainability of the exchange-rate regime, but that 
the future exchange-rate  regime does not affect current fiscal outcomes.  We think this is 
the  most  sensible  (and  conventional)  interpretation  of  the  data.  [See  for  example 
Krugman (1979); related empirical literature that focuses  on developing  economies  in- 
cludes Frankel and Rose (1996), Klein and Marion (1994), and Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco 
(1996).] But we recognize  the logical possibility (discussed  above) that the exchange-rate 
regime  and  fiscal policy  are related  to an unobserved  common  factor which  leads  to 
changes  in fiscal policy accompanied  by a (subsequent)  change in the exchange regime. 
34. Essentially  identical  results  were  obtained  when  estimation  was  by logit and a linear 
specification.  The linear specification allowed us to introduce country dummy variables 
(with which  the probit and logit estimates would  not converge).  These country dummy 
variables  generally  strengthened  the  results  that we  describe here.  The major differ- 
ence was an increase in the statistical significance of the election variable. 
35. The probability of a switch from fixed to flexible exchange  rates is, by definition,  zero if 
the country started out with  flexible exchange  rates. 54 *  GAVIN & PEROTTI 
Table  17  EXPLAINING  TRANSITIONS  FROM  FIXED  TO FLEXIBLE 
EXCHANGE  RATES 
Coefficient 
Overall  Total  Total  Capital  Public 
surplus  revenue  expenditure expenditure consumption 
Fiscal  variable  -7.80  0.590  2.306  0.322  3.352 
(-2.03)  (0.40)  (1.76)  (0.61)  (2.03) 
Election  0.996  0.788  0.995  0.743  0.792 
(1.74)  (1.43)  (1.72)  (1.35)  (1.34) 
3-year  terms of  -3.61  -3.173  -2.789  -3.236  -3.23 
trade growth  (-1.91)  (-1.77)  (-1.62)  (-1.79)  (-1.79) 
3-year real GDP  1.910  -1.210  -1.87  -2.144  -5.132 
growth  (0.42)  (-0.27)  (-0.42)  (-0.48)  (-1.07) 
3-year  real exchange -2.235  -2.200  -2.13  -2.405  -2.368 
rate growth  (-1.42)  (-1.47)  (-1.38)  (-1.58)  (-1.54) 
Exchange  regime,  -0.231  -0.163  -0.218  -0.387  -0.227 
lagged 2 years  (-0.43)  (-0.27)  (-0.38)  (-0.63)  (-0.37) 
Degrees of freedom 116  104  109  100  100 
Cases correct  108  95  101  93  93 
Dependent variable  is equal to one if the country  switched  from  fixed to flexible  exchange  rates  during 
the period and zero otherwise. Sample is restricted  to observations  for which the exchange  rate was 
fixed  in the preceding  year. Estimation  is by probit,  and all explanatory  variables  are  lagged  one period. 
Fiscal  data  refer  to general  government,  and are measured  as a share  of GDP. 
Table 17 summarizes  the results.  In the first column  we  see that large 
fiscal  deficits  are associated  with  a  significantly  higher  probability  of 
switch  from fixed  to flexible  exchange  rates; indeed,  the  fiscal balance 
(and  government  consumption  booms)  is the variable with  the  closest 
statistical relationship  to regime  switch,  as measured  by the  t-statistic. 
This finding  contrasts  with  Frankel and  Rose  (1996), who  find  no  evi- 
dence  that large budget  deficits are associated  with a higher probability 
of  currency  crash.  Sachs,  Tornell,  and  Velasco  (1996) similarly  fail  to 
uncover  evidence  that loose  fiscal policies  increase macroeconomic  vul- 
nerability.36  We also find strong evidence  that adverse external shocks,  in 
the  form  of  declines  in  the  terms  of  trade,  increase  the  probability  of 
exchange  regime switches.  The evidence  also suggests,  though  not with 
36. The studies  differed in many ways,  most notably in the definition  of a "crash." Frankel 
and Rose identify  a crash as "a large depreciation which is also a substantial increase in 
the  rate of change  of nominal  depreciation."  It is thus  a broader concept  of financial 
crisis  than  our  focus  on  exchange-rate-regime  collapse.  Sachs,  Tomell,  and  Velasco 
study  determinants  of  the  impact  of  the  Mexican  "tequila" shock  on  a number  of 
emerging  market economies,  as measured  by a weighted  average of the percentage loss 
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a high  degree  of statistical significance,  that the switches  tend  to occur 
after elections,  and after large exchange-rate appreciations.37 The associa- 
tion  between  elections  and  changes  in  the  exchange-rate  regime  sup- 
ports the idea,  discussed  above,  that the revision of the regime is associ- 
ated with a policy reform package. 
While  the  overall  fiscal  surplus  is  significantly  related  to  regime 
switches,  the association  appears to be due primarily to public spending 
booms,  rather than fluctuations  in fiscal revenue.  Interestingly, fluctua- 
tions in capital spending  are not associated  with regime switches,  while 
public consumption  booms  are. One interpretation of this finding is that 
public  investment  is  viewed  by  market participants  as  productive,  so 
that only  booms  in government  consumption  (and other forms of cur- 
rent expenditure)  contribute to insolvency.  However,  in light of the mea- 
surement  errors that  surround  this  component  of fiscal outcomes,  we 
would  not want to push  this interpretation very hard. 
We have not provided  estimates  for the industrial economies,  because 
the results are easy to summarize.  While we found some evidence  that a 
three-year  period  of low  GDP growth  is associated  with  switches  from 
fixed to flexible exchange  rates, none  of the fiscal or other variables had 
any explanatory power.  In sharp contrast with Latin America, fiscal and 
external shocks  seem  to be much  less  closely  related to the decision  to 
switch from pegged  exchange  rates. 
6. Conclusion 
Our main purpose  in this paper was  to lay out a body  of stylized  facts 
about  fiscal  policy  in  Latin America  and  put  forward  some  tentative 
interpretations.  We  have  found  that  in  a  number  of  dimensions  the 
fiscal outcomes  differ qualitatively  from what  is observed  in industrial 
countries.  We have  found  that fiscal policy  is procyclical,  and  particu- 
larly so in periods  of low  growth,  when  policy  is in particularly coun- 
tercyclical in the  industrial  economies.  This procyclicality may have  to 
do  with  the  voracity  effects  associated  with  political  distortions  that 
have  been  the focus  of several  recent theoretical papers,  and the Latin 
American experience  may help to discriminate among  the various theo- 
retical models. 
We have also suggested  that the procyclicality of fiscal policy in Latin 
America  has  to do with  a loss  during macroeconomic  bad times  of the 
37. Klein and Marion (1994) also find that exchange-rate  pegs  tend to be abandoned  after 
large appreciations.  They do not explore the role of fiscal policy. Dombusch,  Goldfajn, 
and  Valdes  (1995) also  emphasize  the  role of exchange-rate  appreciation  in bringing 
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market access  that would  be required to support a more countercyclical 
fiscal  policy.  This  is  consistent  with  the  fact that access  to emergency 
credit is higher  during  bad times,  and  it also  helps  explain  why  fiscal 
policy  is  particularly  procyclical  in bad  times,  the  cyclical behavior  of 
inflation,  and  why  policy  is  particularly procyclical  for countries  that 
enter a period with high deficits. 
But a number  of further questions  arise. Why is Latin America appar- 
ently  more  afflicted  by  these  problems  than  are the  industrial  econo- 
mies? After all, it is far from obvious  that interest-group  politics are more 
highly  developed  in Latin America than in the industrial economies.  A 
number of potential  explanations,  with  different implications  for policy, 
come  to mind,  including  for example  differences  in income  distribution 
(Perotti, 1996b) and the volatility of the underlying  macroeconomic  envi- 
ronment  (Talvi and  Vegh,  1996; Aizenman,  Gavin,  and  Hausmann, 
1996). We hope  that the database that has been developed  for this paper 
will  create opportunities  to better discriminate  among  these  and other 
potential  explanations. 
We  also  found  very  little  evidence  to  support  the  idea  that  fixed- 
exchange-rate  regimes  promote  fiscal discipline,  and some  evidence  for 
the  opposite  conclusion.  At the  same  time,  the evidence  strongly  sug- 
gests  that  fiscal expansions  have  been  an important  factor behind  the 
collapse  of fixed-exchange-rate  regimes  in Latin America. 
Appendix.  Data 
In this appendix,  we  outline  the methodology  we  have  followed  in as- 
sembling  our database  and list our sources  for each country. Our basic 
source for the central-government  data is the IMF Government  Finance 
Statistics (GFS). The obvious  advantage  of this source is that it follows  a 
consistent  definition  of  the  various  items,  both  in terms  of the  break- 
down  of expenditures  and revenues,  and in terms of the reporting basis, 
which  is always  cash. The two exceptions  are Peru, for which the source 
we used  goes back further than GFS but is identical to GFS for the years 
they overlap,  and Ecuador, for which the coverage of the central govern- 
ment in GFS is very spotty. 
For virtually every country, we supplemented  the electronic version of 
GFS, which  has many  gaps,  with  the printed version.  We also used  the 
printed  version  to check  the coverage  of the central government  every 
year. When  the coverage  changed,  in some cases we were able to recon- 
struct a consistent  and unbroken  coverage  using  the appropriate issues 
of GFS. When even  this failed, we used unpublished  IMF data whenever 
possible,  and  after that,  World Bank data.  These  data have  the  same Fiscal  Policy  in Latin  America  *  57 
primary sources  and  organization  as the  GFS data. As  a result,  all the 
breaks in coverage  we  have  are minimal and concern a few  small agen- 
cies every time. Costa Rica is a partial exception,  as we have not yet been 
able to incorporate decentralized  agencies  before 1987. 
In some  cases,  data were  not available from GFS, particularly at the 
beginning  and/or the end  of our sample  period.  In these  cases,  we  first 
used  other IMF or World Bank data when  available, with the same for- 
mat and  definitions  as the  data we  supplemented.  In any case,  we  al- 
ways  made  sure that GFS and the supplementary  source gave the same 
figures  (up to very  small discrepancies)  for the years of overlap.  When 
we  were  forced  to use  non-IMF sources,  we  accepted  them  only  if the 
discrepancies  over two consecutive  overlapping  years were minimal.  In 
most  cases,  the non-IMF sources  are the same original sources  listed in 
the GFS publication  as the primary source of the GFS data. 
We included  in our definition  of local governments  state,  provincial, 
regional,  and municipal governments.  GFS reports data for local govern- 
ments  mostly  in  its  printed  version,  and  at most  over  the  1975-1990 
period.  However,  in the case of local governments  we  had to resort to 
other  IMF sources  and  to  non-IMF  sources  more  often  than  for  the 
central government.  In assembling  these  sources,  we followed  the same 
criteria outlined  above  for the  central government.  In addition,  we  al- 
ways  made sure that for each country the coverage of local governments 
remains constant  over the whole  sample.  We have also striven to net out 
intergovernmental  flows  between  different levels  of local governments, 
although  this type of information is very scarce outside  the federal coun- 
tries.  One  should  keep  in mind,  though,  that outside  the federal coun- 
tries  most  of  the  intergovernmental  flows  occur  between  the  central 
government  and all the other levels of government,  and we do have and 
use this information. 
GFS  does  not  report  data  for  nonfinancial  public  enterprises.  For 
these,  we  used  IMF sources  when  available (most of the time) and then 
the other sources  listed below. 
We  now  provide  a  detailed  list  of  our  sources  by  country,  for  the 
central government  (CG), local governments  (LG), and nonfinancial pub- 
lic enterprises  (NFPEs), as well as a few notes when  needed. 
Argentina.  CG: 1970-1986,  GFS; 1987-1994,  IMF LG: 1970-1986,  GFS; 
1987-1994,  IMF NFPE: World Bank. Notes:  (1) LG does  not  include 
municipalities  and seminational  health funds  (Obras  Fomientos).  These 
two  sectors  are  not  required  to  have  budgets.  (2)  NFPEs  do  not 
include  provincial  public  enterprises  (mostly  public  utilities)  unless 
they are incorporated  in provincial accounts. 58 *  GAVIN  & PEROTTI 
Bolivia.  CG: 1970-1994,  GFS. Social security  and  decentralized  agen- 
cies: 1970-1983,  World Bank. "Other accounts": 1970-1983,  IMF LG: 
1974-1979,  World Bank; 1980-1994,  GFS. NFPEs: 1974-1979,  World 
Bank; 1980-1994,  IMF Notes:  (1) For 1970-1983,  GFS does  not  have 
data on  social  security  and  decentralized  agencies  and on  "other ac- 
counts";  we  used  World Bank data for social security and decentral- 
ized  agencies,  and  IMF data  for  "other accounts";  data  on  Central 
Administration  for 1970-1983  in these sources are identical to the GFS 
data. 
Brazil.  CG:  1970-1992,  GFS.  LG:  1970-1976,  IMF; 1977-1992,  GFS. 
NFPEs: 1980-1994,  IMF Notes:  (1) Total revenues  are subject to large 
cash adjustment  in certain years.  Hence,  in those years total tax reve- 
nues  are different from the sum of individual  tax revenues.  (2) NFPEs 
do not include  municipal  enterprises. 
Chile.  CG: 1972-1994,  GFS.  LG: 1974-1988,  GFS; 1989-1994,  Informe 
Gesti6n Financiera  del Estado, Contraloria General de la Repiublica, vari- 
ous issues.  NFPEs: CODELCO, 1974-1994,  IMF;  other NFPEs, exclud- 
ing CODELCO, 1974-1986,  IMF; 1987-1994,  Estadisticas  de las Finanzas 
Publicas 1989-95,  Ministerio  de Hacienda,  Direccion  de Presupuesto. 
Notes:  (1)  For  a  few  CG  items  between  1989 and  1994,  we  used 
Estadisticas de las Finanzas Publicas 1989-95,  Ministerio  de  Hacienda, 
Direccion de Presupuesto. 
Colombia.  CG: 1974-1978,  World Bank for revenues,  GFS for expendi- 
tures;  1979-1988,  GFS; 1989-1995,  IMF LG: 1974-1979,  World Bank; 
1980-1991,  GFS; 1992-1995,  IMF: NFPEs:  1974-1980,  World  Bank; 
1981-1995,  IMF 
Costa Rica.  CG: 1973-1994,  GFS. LG: 1972-1984,  GFS; 1985-1994, Mem- 
oria  Anual, Contraloria General de la Republica. NFPEs: IMF Notes: (1) 
Central  government  does  not  include  decentralized  agencies  before 
1987. 
Ecuador.  CG: 1972-1995,  Cuentas Nacionales de Ecuador,  Banco Central 
del Ecuador. LC: 1972-1995,  Cuentas  Nacionales  de Ecuador,  Banco Cen- 
tral  del  Ecuador.  NFPEs:  1972-1995,  Cuentas Nacionales de Ecuador, 
Banco Central del  Ecuador. Notes:  (1) These  are national  income  ac- 
count  data,  not budget  data.  (2) As  a measure  of intergovernmental 
transfers  from  CG to LG, we  used  transfers  to LG from FONAPAR 
(Fondo Nacional  de Participaci6n), from IMF 
Mexico.  CG:  1970-1990,  GFS; 1991-1995,  IMF  LG: 1972-1982,  GFS; 
1983-1994,  Estadisticas de  Finanzas Publicas Estadales y  Municipales, 
INEGI, various issues.  NFPEs: 1971-1986,  Informe  del Gobierno,  various 
issues;  1987-1995,  IMF: Notes:  (1) State finances include  the accounts 
of  the  Federal  District.  (2) Individual  tax revenues  are gross  of  tax Fiscal  Policy  in Latin  America  *  59 
certificate credits,  which  are netted  out only  from total tax revenues; 
therefore,  in some years total tax revenues  are different from the sum 
of individual  taxes. 
Panama.  CG:  1973-1993,  GFS.  LG: 1973-1993,  Estadisticas Panamena, 
Situaci6n Economica,  Hacienda Publica y Finanzas, Contraloria General, 
various issues.  NFPEs: 1973-1993,  Estadisticas  Panamena,  Situaci6n  Eco- 
n6mica,  Hacienda  Publica  y Finanzas, Contraloria General, various issues. 
Paraguay.  CG: 1972-1993,  GFS; 1994-1995,  IMF LG: 1970-1988,  IMF; 
1989-1994,  Juan Alberto  Neffa,  Decentralizacion  Fiscal: El Caso Para- 
guayo, CEPAL/GTZ, Santiago del Chile,  1996. NFPEs: IMF Notes:  (1) 
In 1989-1993,  GFS stopped  reporting data for social security and de- 
centralized  agencies;  we  supplemented  GFS using  IMF data.  (2) Our 
source for LG 1989-1994 has the same primary source as the IMF data 
that we  use  for 1970-1988,  namely  the  Ministerio  de  Hacienda,  Se- 
cretaria Tecnica de Planificaci6n. 
Peru.  CG: 1968-1994,  Peru  en Numeros. LG: 1968-1994, Peru  en Numeros. 
NFPEs: 1968-1994,  Peru en Numeros. Notes:  (1) CG identical  to GFS 
after 1980; before 1980, slight discrepancy  due to break in coverage  in 
GFS. 
Uruguay.  CG: 1970-1994,  GFS. LG: 1974-1994, IMF NFPEs: 1974-1994, 
Banco Central de  Uruguay.  Notes:  (1) LG covers  the  municipality  of 
Montevideo  only. 
Venezuela.  CG:  1970-1994,  GFS.  LG:  1970-1979,  Informe Economico, 
Banco Central de  Venezuela;  1980-1986,  IMF; 1987-1994,  Anuario de 
Cuentas  Nacionales,  Banco Central de Venezuela, various issues.  NFPEs: 
1970-1994,  IMF Notes: (1) After 1986, revenues  of decentralized  agen- 
cies  are not  covered  in  the  CG accounts.  However,  these  revenues 
represent  only  about 2% of total revenues.  (2) Data on LG after 1986 
from Anuario de Cuentas Nacionales  are from national income accounts. 
We checked  the robustness  of our results by excluding  them from our 
sample.  (3) Data from Informe  Econ6mico  are identical  to GFS data in 
overlapping  years. 
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1.  Introduction 
Empirical work  on  Latin American  macroeconomics  has  almost  exclu- 
sively  focused  on monetary  policy  and inflation.  Researchers have  cer- 
tainly  seen  fiscal  deficits  as  a  major underlying  determinant  of  high 
inflation,  but have rarely studied  fiscal policy in its own right. The topic 
of this paper is thus highly welcome.  I find the paper thought-provoking 
and carefully crafted. Gavin and Perotti have really done  the profession 
a great service by putting  together  a comprehensive  dataset that others 
are likely  to  use  in  the  years  to come.  This is a fine  contribution,  but 
having  praised  it, it is hard for a discussant  to say much more about it. 
After an account of some basic facts of Latin American fiscal policy in 
the  last twenty-five  years,  against  the backdrop of corresponding  data 
for the industrialized  countries,  most of the paper revolves  around two 
stylized  facts: (1) Latin American fiscal policy is highly procyclical, com- 
pared  to the  industrial  countries,  and  (2) fixed exchange  rates seem  to 
provide  little fiscal discipline  in Latin America.  While the  paper docu- 
ments  these  facts in great detail,  it is perhaps  somewhat  less successful 
in  taking  the  next  natural  step,  addressing  follow-up  questions  like: 
How  do we explain these  facts? What should  we make of the stark fiscal 
policy differences  between  Latin America and the OECD? 
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In the  following,  I first discuss  the explanations  for procyclical fiscal 
policy  suggested  by  the  authors.  I then  suggest  another,  alternative 
explanation.  Finally, I make  a few  brief remarks on  the  link  between 
fiscal discipline  and the exchange-rate  regime. 
2.  Procyclical  Fiscal  Policy:  The  Authors'  Interpretations 
The  authors  convincingly  demonstrate  that the  fiscal  surplus  behaves 
very differently  in Latin American countries than in the industrial coun- 
tries.  In  the  latter,  government  spending  is  on  average  acyclical  and 
taxes  strongly  procyclical,  implying  that the fiscal surplus  is positively 
correlated with GDP growth: controlling for some other determinants  of 
the surplus,  the elasticity of the surplus-measured  as a share of GDP- 
with  regard to GDP growth  is about 0.37 (see Gavin and Perotti's Table 
8). In Latin America, instead,  the corresponding  elasticity is estimated at 
0.04 and insignificantly  different  from zero.  The reason is not so much 
different behavior of revenues.  Rather, government  spending  falls drasti- 
cally in recessions;  the procyclical pattern of spending  is, indeed,  particu- 
larly  marked  in  severe  recessions.  While  neoclassical  tax-smoothing 
theory could explain  this pattern if GDP shocks were more persistent  in 
Latin America,  Gavin and  Perotti show  this not to be the case.  So one 
has  to seek  an explanation  elsewhere.  The paper suggests  three candi- 
dates:  (1) reverse Keynesian causation, whereby  misguided  discretionary 
policy causes  recessions;  (2) voracity  effects,  whereby  government  spend- 
ing  becomes  positively  correlated  with  available  revenue  for political- 
economy  reasons;  (3)  international credit constraints, whereby  lack  of 
credit constrains  government  spending  in recessions. 
How  could  we  discriminate  among  suggested  explanations?  A  pre- 
ferred approach would  be to derive the procyclical property from a theo- 
retical model  and then  check whether  the model's  auxiliary predictions 
for other macroeconomic  variables also hold up. This is not the approach 
the authors  take; they  instead  rely on an informal discussion.  To illus- 
trate what I mean,  let me take two other salient facts that may be helpful 
in  discriminating  between  different  explanations.  First,  the  volatility 
(standard  deviation)  of  private  consumption  and  GDP  are about  the 
same  in  the  OECD,  whereas  the  volatility  of  private  consumption  is 
clearly higher  than the volatility of GDP in Latin America (the volatility 
of GDP itself  is also much  higher  in Latin America than in the OECD). 
Second,  as  Gavin  and  Perotti emphasize,  inflation  is negatively  corre- 
lated with GDP growth in the OECD, whereas  the correlation is positive 
in Latin America. Comment  63 
1.  Reverse Keynesian  causation. The reverse  Keynesian  story seems  hard 
to reconcile  with  the  aforementioned  additional  facts.  If misguided 
policy-induced  demand  shocks  were  a  major cause  of  recessions, 
then we should presumably  observe less private-consumption  volatil- 
ity  and  a  positive  correlation  between  inflation  and  GDP in  Latin 
America, and not the reverse. 
2.  Voracity  effects. Talvi and  Vegh  (1996) suggest  how  a  conventional 
optimal taxation model,  extended  with a (reduced form) positive rela- 
tion between  government  spending  and revenue,  may explain  pro- 
cyclical fiscal policy. The positive  relation arises because  a weak gov- 
ernment  may be in the hands  of pressure  groups  that demand  more 
spending  when  the government  revenue is plentiful (ultimately there 
must be some  asymmetric information for this story to make sense).1 
Operating  under  this additional  constraint,  the government  finds  it 
optimal to depart from the conventional  tax smoothing  solution,  and 
meet  a positive  shock  to the  tax base by drawing  down  tax rates on 
labor and  money.  An  outside  observer  would  thus  see  high  GDP 
growth  associated  with  higher  than  normal  government  spending 
and  lower  than  normal  inflation;  an  induced  effect  may  well  be 
higher volatility of private consumption.  This story may thus be con- 
sistent with  the auxiliary facts above. 
3.  International credit constraints. Gavin  and  Perotti  do  present  some 
independent  evidence  that international credit constraints may have 
been  particularly severe  in Latin American recessions.  Is the credit- 
constraint story also consistent  with the auxiliary facts? Suppose-as 
is  reasonable-that  credit  constraints  have  been  equally  (or more) 
severe  for private agents,  and that a credit-constrained  government 
uses  the inflation  tax as a last-resort source of revenue.  Under these 
assumptions,  the  facts may indeed  be consistent  with  international 
creditors pulling  out in (exogenously)  bad times.  That this explana- 
tion may hold  water is quite sensible.  After all, the debt crisis of the 
1980s is part of the authors' panel dataset. 
The surviving interpretations  (2) and (3) need not, of course, be substi- 
tutes.  And  Keynesian  effects,  if not the main cause of procyclical fiscal 
policy, may well have amplified  initial shocks. 
1. In addition to the papers mentioned by Gavin and Perotti,  Svensson (1996)  suggests a 
model which also implies procyclical  government spending: cooperation  between a 
number  of interest  groups, drawing  rents from  a weak government,  temporarily  breaks 
down after a positive shock to government revenue, causing a temporary  burst of 
government spending. The main argument  in Becker  and Mulligan  (1996)-although 
the paper  deals with a different  topic-can  also be understood  as additional  government 
revenue getting spent for political-economy  reasons. 64 *  PERSSON 
A  natural  question,  which  the  authors  don't  pose,  is  exactly  what 
conclusions  one  may  draw  from  the  different  fiscal behavior  in  Latin 
America and the OECD. Does it mean that these  groups of countries are 
inherently  different? It seems  to me that the authors' results are consis- 
tent with  a different  answer.  If mechanisms  (2) and (3) are operating  in 
Latin America,  they  could very well be latent in the OECD countries  as 
well.  But as macroeconomic  developments  have not been nearly as vola- 
tile in the OECD, we  don't see any significant manifestations  of voracity 
effects  or international  credit constraints  in more recent data.  It would 
indeed  be  interesting  to  go  back  to  more  volatile  historical  periods- 
such  as  the  interwar  period-and  look  for  signs  of  procyclical  fiscal 
policy  in the industrialized  countries.  An additional  observation  in line 
with  this argument  is the case of Colombia: GDP volatility in that coun- 
try is similar to that of Germany, Italy, or Japan over the sample  period. 
And  the correlation between  government  spending  and GDP in Colom- 
bia has,  indeed,  also been  of the same magnitude  as in these  industrial- 
ized countries  (see Talvi and Vegh,  1996). 
3.  Procyclical  Fiscal  Policy:  An Alternative  Interpretation 
When  discussing  the paper in the conference,  I argued  that an alterna- 
tive  mechanism  might  help  explain  the  different  cyclical properties  of 
the  fiscal surplus  across  Latin America  and  the  OECD. The argument 
was  that inflation,  and  not  discretionary  fiscal measures,  might  be the 
explanation.  Four preliminary  observations  indicate  why  this might  be 
the  case: (1) With important  components  of government  budgets  non- 
indexed,  both on the expenditure  and on the revenue  side, inflation may 
substantially  improve  fiscal outcomes.  In their case  study  of Sweden, 
Persson,  Persson,  and  Svensson  (1996) estimate  such  indirect  budget 
effects  to be  quantitatively  much  more important  than the inflationary 
channels  emphasized  in  the  theoretical  literature  (dilution  of  the  real 
value  of  money  and  outstanding  government  debt).  (2) As  stated  in 
Gavin  and  Perotti's  paper  (and  the  previous  section),  inflation  is pro- 
cyclical in the OECD, but countercyclical in Latin America. Indeed,  infla- 
tion tends to be particularly high in severe recessions,  when  government 
surpluses  are also high.  (3) Volatility of inflation is much higher in Latin 
America than in the OECD. (4) Colombia, the only Latin American coun- 
try with  an  acyclical  fiscal  surplus,  indeed  has  a positive,  rather than 
negative,  correlation between  inflation and GDP.2 
2. The data backing up the empirical statements  in this section are all taken from Talvi and 
Vegh  (1996). Comment 65 
In the  revised  version  of  the  paper  Gavin  and  Perotti do  make  an 
attempt to address  this hypothesis.  Their procedure is to add a measure 
of inflationary  surprises-obtained  as the residual of a regression  of the 
inflation  rate  on  lagged  inflation  rates,  lagged  deficits,  terms-of-trade 
changes,  and country fixed effects-to  their estimated  relation between 
the fiscal surplus  and GDP growth.  And they find that inflationary sur- 
prises  are unimportant  for this relation.  I am not convinced,  however, 
that this really addresses  the problem.  The reason is that almost all the 
effects discussed  by Persson,  Persson, and Svensson  will be triggered by 
unanticipated  and anticipated  inflation alike: it is realized inflation that 
will dilute the real value of, say, nonindexed  pensions.  If the argument is 
that anticipated inflation will be compensated  for ahead of time by discre- 
tionary  measures  that keep  the  real value  of fiscal commitments  con- 
stant,  I still do not  see  why  only  unanticipated  inflation matters. For if 
such  ex ante compensation  takes  place,  then  anticipated  inflation  does 
not affect the fiscal surplus  (measured  as a share of GDP). But that is an 
issue  that could be settled  empirically.3 
I will  therefore  reiterate my  claim that inflation-anticipated  or un- 
anticipated-is  a potential omitted variable in the authors' regressions.  I 
will also claim that the resulting bias in the estimates  of the effect of the 
cycle on the fiscal surplus may be quantitatively significant.  To see why, 
suppose  the  fiscal surplus  as a share of GDP, s, is truly determined  by 
GDP growth,  Ay, and inflation,  ir, according to model  1: 
s =  a1 + i  Zly  +  yrT  +  61. 
The researcher, however,  estimates  model 2: 
s  =  a2 +  32 Ay  +  2. 
The expected  omitted-variable  bias from such  a procedure  can be esti- 
mated as 
B =  E(i,  -  ,2) =  yp(Ay,  r) 
ray 
3. Of course, one  needs  to worry about simultaneity.  But that could be handled by 
instrumental-variable  estimation. I would have been much happier  if the authors had 
checked the robustness of the estimated effects of the cycle on the fiscal surplus, not 
using the residuals  from the inflation  equation  described  in footnote 17, but rather  the 
fitted values from this equation. 66  PERSSON 
where p(Ay, Ir) denotes  the correlation coefficient between  Xr  and Ay, and 
where  the  fraction is the  relative  standard  deviation  of these  two  vari- 
ables. The results in Persson,  Persson,  and Svensson  (1996) suggest  that 
a value of y of about 0.3 is appropriate for Sweden  (10% higher inflation 
improves  the fiscal surplus  by about 3% of GDP). Using  this value  and 
empirical values over the sample period for the other terms in the expres- 
sion,  we  find  that B for Latin America is negative  and equal to  -0.23, 
whereas  B for  the  OECD  is  positive  and  equal  to  0.06.  Omitting  the 
dependence  of the fiscal surplus on inflation may thus bias the estimated 
coefficients  p2 towards  a difference  on  the  order of  0.3.  This number 
corresponds  pretty  closely-and  with  the right sign-to  the difference 
in the regression  coefficients  of the surplus  on GDP growth  that Gavin 
and Perotti report in Table 8. 
Of course,  the above argument is just the kind of "quick and dirty job" 
you  might  get  away  with  as a discussant  pressed  for time-the  regres- 
sion underlying  Table 8 is not a simple regression,  so the formula for bias 
is more complicated;  the data I fished  out of Talvi and Vegh's  paper are 
not exactly the same as those used by Gavin and Perotti; I did not run the 
right (model  1 type) regressions  myself,  and so on. But I believe  that the 
argument  is convincing  enough  to warrant a further investigation  into 
whether  and to what extent the different cyclical behavior of the surplus 
is due to the different cyclical behavior of inflation. What difference does 
it make if this is the case? A lot. For if inflation is really the culprit, then 
we  are back to square one,  namely  to monetary  policy-the  traditional 
topic in Latin American macroeconomic  policy. 
4.  Fiscal  Discipline  and Fixed  Exchange  Rates 
The results in Section 5 of the paper tell us a great deal about the average 
conditions  under  which  Latin  American  stabilization  programs  with 
exchange-rate  pegs  as an active ingredient  were implemented  in the last 
twenty-five  years.  But the  authors  also  suggest  that the  results  tell us 
something  about  a larger question,  challenging  conventional  wisdom 
that fixed exchange  rates provide more fiscal discipline.  I would  just like 
to make the point that the larger question  is quite ill posed  and that the 
conventional  wisdom,  challenged  or not, is too unspecific  to be of much 
guidance.  There are two reasons  for this. 
First, even  though  the  international-finance  literature is full of com- 
parisons  between  "fixed" and "floating" rates, the distinction  is too im- 
precise to be operational.  Fixed exchange  rates are only one out of many 
possible  intermediate  targets for monetary  policy (and as such they can 
have very different consequences  depending  on the peg: pegging  to the Comment*  67 
deutsche  mark and  to  the  Greek  drachma  are certainly  not  the  same 
thing).  Floating  exchange  rates,  being  the  complement  to  fixed  rates, 
thus  span a variety of different operating procedures  for monetary  pol- 
icy (most textbooks  implicitly assume  money-supply  targeting to be the 
alternative). 
The second  reason why  the larger question  is ill posed  is that commit- 
ment to a monetary regime can be more or less well enforced,  depending 
on  its  institutional  underpinnings.  Thus  "fixed  rates"  encompass  an 
entire  spectrum,  ranging  from  monetary  unions  or  currency  boards, 
through  multilateral  exchange-rate  arrangements  with  sanctions  for 
transgressions,  to unilateral  pegs  by  dependent  central banks.  Similar 
distinctions  hold  for alternative monetary  targets. The discipline  that is 
going  to  be  imposed  on  the  fiscal  authority-deriving  from  eventual 
accommodation  or not,  by the central bank,  of a fiscal expansion,  and 
from financial markets' expectations  about accommodation  or not-thus 
crucially depends  on  the  institutional  ramification of the  monetary  re- 
gime.  To put it in the language  of Sargent and Wallace: what matters for 
fiscal discipline  is who  is the dominant  player in the game between  the 
fiscal and monetary  authority. Posing  general questions  about the fiscal 
discipline  imposed  by  "fixed exchange  rates," without  being  very  spe- 
cific about the alternative operating procedure and the institutional back- 
ing, is therefore much too vague. 
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been  discussed  recently  in the  literature, and  it will  also  help  unearth 
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new  puzzles.  As  a result,  new  research  may  be  generated  which  will 
help us better understand  the way fiscal policy is formed in these  coun- 
tries.  It is  to be  hoped  that improved  design  of fiscal institutions  and 
more  efficient  fiscal  policy,  from  the  social  point  of  view,  will  be  the 
result. 
The paper concentrates  on the analysis of some of these  stylized  facts. 
In this brief discussion,  I will describe some mechanisms  that link institu- 
tional  characteristics  common  to  several  developing  countries  to  two 
puzzling  regularities  of the Latin American database.  The two regulari- 
ties are the procyclicality of fiscal policy and the failure of fixed exchange 
rates to induce  more fiscal discipline  than flexible rates. 
In Latin America,  only a few  strong groups have access to fiscal reve- 
nue.  Private banks and their associated  industrial conglomerates,  strong 
unions,  state-owned  enterprises,  and provincial governments  can all be 
included  in  this  select  group.  Moreover,  in  many  of  these  countries, 
there  are no  strong  countervailing  institutions  to impede  discretionary 
fiscal redistribution.  Because  each  group  enjoys  de facto access  to fiscal 
resources,  a  "tragedy  of  the  commons"  results.  Representative-agent 
models  of fiscal policy  cannot  be used  to analyze  these  economies,  be- 
cause they are not designed  to handle such conditions.  A more appropri- 
ate approach  to  studying  fiscal policy  in these  developing  countries  is 
one where  redistribution  among  groups  plays a central role. 
To generate  procyclical fiscal policy, a positive  shock which  increases 
income  must produce  a more than proportional increase in fiscal spend- 
ing,  even  if the shock is expected  to be transitory. This can be called the 
voracity effect. It should  be  clear that  representative-agent  models  are 
incapable  of  producing  voracity  effects  in  the  presence  of  transitory 
shocks.  How can a model with multiple powerful groups generate vorac- 
ity?  Suppose  that  the  growth  rates  of  output  and  fiscal  revenue  are 
proportional  to  some  productivity  parameter.  Furthermore,  suppose 
that every  group  has  access  to fiscal revenue,  but that each group  can 
invest  its  resources  in  a truly private  way.  That is,  a group  need  not 
consume  all the fiscal resources  which  it appropriates.  It can save them 
with a private technology.  If groups do not engage  in a fiscal war, where 
every  group  appropriates  as  much  fiscal resources  as it can,  then  the 
equilibrium  rate of return that each group receives  on its private assets 
must be equal to the raw rate of return on fiscal assets,  minus the appro- 
priation rates of the other n-1 groups. 
Now  suppose  that the economy  is hit by a shock that increases the raw 
rate of growth  of fiscal assets and income by Z, such as a productivity or 
terms-of-trade  shock.  It follows  that each group will have  the opportu- 
nity to appropriate  more fiscal resources  without  inducing  a fiscal war. Comment*  69 
How  much  more can each group appropriate? To answer  this question, 
note  that from the  point  of view  of group  1, the  other n-1 groups  can 
increase  the sum  of their appropriations  by Z. In this way, after appro- 
priation by others,  the fiscal assets'  rate of return will equal the rate of 
return that group  1 receives  from its private assets.  The calculation can 
then  be performed  for each of the n groups.  Therefore,  in equilibrium, 
each group  can increase  its appropriation by Z/(n-l).  This implies  that 
aggregate appropriation increases by Zn/(n-1),  which is greater than the 
original  shock.  The details  of this argument  can be found  in Lane and 
Tornell (1997). 
The second  regularity is the failure of fixed exchange  rates to induce 
more  fiscal discipline  in Latin America.  Contrary to accepted  wisdom, 
Gavin  and  Perotti's dataset  reveals  that fiscal deficits  tend  to be larger 
under  fixed exchange  rates than under  flexible ones.  Furthermore, this 
cannot  be  explained  by  the  fact that  macroeconomic  conditions  were 
worse  at the time when  fixed rates were adopted. 
According  to  conventional  wisdom,  fixed  rates  provide  more  fiscal 
discipline  because  adopting  lax fiscal policies must eventually  lead to an 
exhaustion  of reserves and a collapse of the peg. This collapse implies an 
enormous  political cost for the policymaker. The fear of this cost imposes 
discipline  on the policymakers.  The problem with  this argument is that 
there are also costs  under flexible rates; the difference is that the effects 
of  unsound  policies  manifest  themselves  immediately  through  move- 
ments  in  the  exchange  rate.  In order for fixed  rates  to  provide  more 
discipline  than flexible rates, one would  have to assume  that it is politi- 
cally more costly to devalue  under fixed rates than it would be to devalue 
under  flexible  rates.  However,  both  theoretically  and  empirically, it is 
unclear why  this should  occur. 
Tornell and  Velasco  (1997) provide  empirical  evidence  that  comple- 
ments  the  evidence  of  Gavin  and  Perotti.  They  examine  the  serious 
stabilization episodes  that took place in Latin America from 1960 to 1994. 
These include  13 exchange-rate  programs and 9 money-based  programs. 
After controlling  for past fiscal balances,  changes  in terms of trade, and 
the  U.S.  interest  rate,  they  find  that the  improvement  in the  primary 
fiscal balance-to-GDP  ratio averages  around 2 percentage  points  higher 
under  money-based  programs  than  under  exchange-rate-based  pro- 
grams.  This  disparity  is  different  from zero  at the  1% level  of  signifi- 
cance.  The  figure  for the  nominal  balance  is also 2 percentage  points. 
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Discussion 
Bennett McCallum asked the authors to elaborate on how  they classified 
countries  by exchange-rate  regime.  More specifically, did they classify a 
country  according  to what  that country  reported  to the  IMF? Further, 
were  countries  with  purportedly  fixed exchange  rates but which  deval- 
ued  frequently  classified  as  fixed-rate  countries?  McCallum  cautioned 
that  the  latter  question  is  particularly  important  if  the  authors  were 
asking whether  a fixed exchange  rate serves as a discipline device.  Gavin 
replied  that they  did  use  the  IMF classifications  and argued  that these 
categories  do capture some  important differences  in policy regimes.  He 
agreed,  though,  that it would  be useful  to develop  a method  of classify- 
ing exchange-rate  regimes  more finely. 
In response  to  the  author's  various  explanations  of  Latin American 
procyclical fiscal policy, Julio Rotemberg wanted  to know  how  different 
the borrowing-constraints  interpretation was from a standard Keynesian 
story. In particular, he pointed  out that an event that restricts a country's 
access  to  international  capital  markets  could  be  viewed  simply  as  an 
exogenous  shock  to  the  government's  ability  to  spend,  which  would 
then  have  the standard Keynesian  effects on output.  He argued that in 
order to tell a different  story, one  would  need  to argue that the output 
movements  themselves  were  the source of the credit constraints.  Gavin 
suggested  that  Rotemberg's  interpretation  is  not  very  different  from 
theirs, except that they view  the fiscal response  as a propagation mecha- 
nism  rather than  as  a causal  impulse.  For example,  in  1995 Argentina 
and Mexico both experienced  major financial-market crises,  which  con- 
strained the abilities of both governments  to finance fiscal deficits just as 
their economies  entered recession.  Gavin argued that in both cases fiscal 
changes  were not the driving force, though  the fiscal responses  certainly 
propagated  the initial shocks. 
Marvin Goodfriend  expressed  concern that large countries such as the 
United  States and Brazil might be responsible  for much of the observed 
differences  between  the OECD and Latin American samples.  Gavin re- 
plied  that this was  not the case,  and he added  that in future work they 
planned  to look  at international  differences  within  regions.  Colombia, 
for example,  is  an  interesting  outlier,  being  the  only  Latin American 
country  consistently  to run countercyclical  fiscal policies  and to have  a 
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relatively  stable  economy.  Moreover,  some  of  the  lower-income  and 
more highly  indebted  OECD countries  resemble  Latin American  coun- 
tries  along  a  number  of  dimensions.  Olivier  Blanchard pursued  this 
point,  asking  whether  OECD countries  with  roughly  the  same  income 
per capita as some  of the Latin American countries would  be statistically 
distinguishable  from the  Latin American  sample.  Gavin admitted  that 
they  had  not  carried out  that specific exercise but thought  it would  be 
difficult, given  the small overlap across the two groups. 
Angus  Deaton suggested  that macroeconomic volatility in Latin Amer- 
ica could  reflect in part those  nations'  dependence  on commodities  and 
their consequent  vulnerability  to terms-of-trade shocks.  He pointed  out 
that commodity  prices are poorly understood  and extremely difficult to 
forecast, so that even  a policymaker with the best of motives  would  find 
it difficult  to plan  effectively  in  such  an environment.  Citing  his  own 
work on Africa, he noted  that there seems  to be little difference in fiscal 
performance between  countries whose  governments  directly control the 
staple  commodity  and  countries  where  the  commodity  is  privately 
owned  and marketed,  as with crops. 
Michael  Klein asked  if there  was  any  role for differences  in income 
inequality  across  the  countries  in  explaining  the  findings  about  fiscal 
policy.  For example,  during  good  times,  does  a country  with  large in- 
equalities want to help the lower end of the distribution more than those 
with very little inequality? Gavin agreed that this was an important issue 
which  bore further investigation. 
Michael Gavin then responded  to a number of points made by the dis- 
cussants.  He agreed with Persson that the reverse Keynesian explanation 
has problems  but suggested  that it is still likely that fiscal procyclicality 
amplifies  economic  volatility in Latin America. In response  to a sugges- 
tion  that private-sector  spending  decisions  could  offset  fiscal retrench- 
ment in bad times,  he noted  that credit constraints appear to be binding 
for private agents as well as the government  in bad times. Agreeing with 
Persson's  comment  regarding  the  importance  of inflation,  Gavin men- 
tioned  that they had found  inflation surprises to have significant effects 
on both  government  spending  and revenues.  However,  Latin America 
and the OECD were also different in this respect, as they found inflation 
surprises  to have  positive  effects  on the government  budget  surplus  in 
the OECD and negative  effects in Latin America. 